Hi Readers: Having just read the January 2008 issue of Plane and Pilot (a GA - piston engine aircraft magazine), I,m happy to see some focus on the present low numbers of student pilots, pilots in general, and technicians. The articles by Peter Bunce of GAMA, and Marc C. Lee regarding the shortages and what can be done to reinvigorate GA interest was interesting, but barely scratching the surface for the root reasons. And, of course, the bulk of the shortages of pilots involve propjet and turbine jet pilots for the airlines and commuter flying.
In perspective, the shortages are not just GA, but well across the spectrum of aviation. Air travel is bursting at the seams, new types of airplanes, particularly jet types, are now being produced in numbers ---and where are the numbers of pilots, mechanics, and technicians to accommodate these increases?
Let's review the facts as seen by FAA: The total pilot population, now little greater than 598,000, will increase to about 722,000 by year 2030, an average growth over a 23-year period of 0.8%. The largest growth is expected in the Commercial and Student Pilot categories. Commercial aircraft operations (the sum of Air Carrier and Commuter/Air Taxi) at all U.S. airports (Towered and nontowered) are projected to increase from 29 million to 37.3 million in year 2020 and to 45.4 million in year 2030.
Meanwhile GA operations is forecasted to increase from about 81 million to 92.1 million in year 2020 and 100.4 million in year 2030. Much of the growth will be the result of increased use of a turbine fleet for Business/Corporate related flying. The Cargo jet fleet will have similar proportionate increases, and the Regional/Commuter fleet is expected to grow from about 2,800 aircraft to just under 5,000 by year 2030. By itself, GA aircraft is expected to increase from 227,000 to 275,000 in 2020, such growth because of flight-hour increases at a faster rate than the total aircraft fleet, but at the same time more sensitive to fuel prices and to variations in the general economic growth.
As for renewed interest by the younger populations in flying as pilots and other aviation careers, a study in itself, specific programs and efforts by Government, Aircraft Companies, and Training Schools must be designed and sponsored. I advocate a Govt-Industry sponsored Civilian Pilot and Technician Training Program (which I am currently working on), perhaps with service commitments to Military and Government Departments, to eliminate shortages and prepare for the future. Such a program was put in place by the Commerce Department in the 1930's, if you remember. In fact, I learned to fly in that very program, and was committed to service in the Army Air Forces.
The most plausible answer to the lack of interest and response to current aviation by the younger people, I think, is their lack of technical education, and the money, to pursue aviation pursuits and careers. Added to the problem is the seemingly lack of instructor people in the flying and technical aspects of the problem.
I'm still working on the November 2007 aircraft accident count and analysis.
To get away from some of our problems, I have a Cat story for you. I received the following in an early Christmas card from a friend in Monterey, California: (You don't have to own a cat to appreciate this one...)
A couple was dressed and ready to go out for the evening. They turned on a night light, turned on the telephone answering machine, covered their pet parakeet, and put the cat in the back yard. Then they phoned the local cab company and requested a taxi. The taxi arrived and the couple opened the front door to leave their house. The cat they had put out into the yard scoots back into the house. They don't want the cat shut in the house because "she" always tries to eat the bird. The wife goes out to the taxi while the husband goes inside to get the cat. The cat runs upstairs, the man in hot pursuit. The wife doesn't want the driver to know the house will be empty. She explains to the taxi driver that her husband will be out soon. "He's just going upstairs to say goodbye to my mother." A few minutes later, the husband gets into the cab. "Sorry I took so long," he says, as they drive away. "Stupid bitch was hiding under the bed. Had to poke her with a coat hangar to get her to come out! Then I had to wrap her in a blanket to keep her from scratching me. But it worked. I hauled her fat ass downstairs and threw her out into the back yard!" The cabdriver hit a parked car...
Thanks for listening. Robert Shaw.
Showing posts with label flying hours. Show all posts
Showing posts with label flying hours. Show all posts
Saturday, December 8, 2007
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
The Latest and Such!
Hi Readers: The current pilot shortage is having an effect on airline operations. It has been reported that American Eagle, subsidiary of American Airlines, and others, have eliminated flights from their winter schedule because of the shortage. American Eagle had previously reduced the minimum experience requirements to 500 hours to attract pilots. New training standards, recently adopted by ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), and the increased use of simulators is expected to qualify more First Officers. This news is well worth investigating for new pilots, but remember, more experience, better the chances. Your heading for the big airplanes.
Now it's time for a little trivia (so I can get my act together and before the November NTSB Accident count). Did you know that we now have computer concepts beyond the planning stage that will replace our current computers? More 'search engines', more information, etc. Do we need more and more? How many hours are we spending on the computer to find something that we really don't need or can't use? Okay, then, we'll accept the future computers and get on with it!
Now for the amateur poetry section: I composed this one sleepless night.
Now it's time for a little trivia (so I can get my act together and before the November NTSB Accident count). Did you know that we now have computer concepts beyond the planning stage that will replace our current computers? More 'search engines', more information, etc. Do we need more and more? How many hours are we spending on the computer to find something that we really don't need or can't use? Okay, then, we'll accept the future computers and get on with it!
Now for the amateur poetry section: I composed this one sleepless night.
Alone
Yes, I am alone, I'm glad you asked,
Not my choice, too often not happy,
Am I up to the task?
To myself, I say, is this really living?
I wonder, little better than dead.
Relatives few, not a wife, yet considerable
Strife,
A friend or two, no one to please or command,
That's my life.
I never thought I'd reach this far,
Now maybe too far, maybe best to go,
I don't know.
Still, each day arrives, I begin, then hesitate,
The face of it, often hard, seems not to end,
Somehow I continue on, and try again.
A choice you say, I think not,
When I look at others, oh so slow,
I think not for me, fast forward, let me go.
Some say busy is best, later you can rest.
A project, perhaps, a friend in need,
Anyway a good deed.
Better you feel, the sadness gone,
Life is worth living.
A way yet to go, with GOD and grace, and giving,
Still, I don't know.
Robert Shaw
If you are reading this, you are probably looking for more and current information on aviation subjects. This I will provide in the future. If there is something special that I can help you with, E-mail me at roberthshaw@sbcglobal.net. And, don't forget, I need your feedback, too.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Aircraft Icing
Hi Readers: Now that we are in the winter weather of the year, we must all face the fact that, for flying, icing conditions on the ground or in the air is upon us (although icing conditions can occur in flight at any time of the year depending on the weather systems). Icing conditions on the ground before flight without de-icing is dangerous (and foolhardy) and icing conditions at altitude without de-icing and anti-icing are dangerous and lethal. In flight, icing can cause rapid loss of altitude and/or loss of control in minutes. If your airplane is not equipped with de-icing and anti-icing gear, or not certified for flight in icing conditions, its your knowledge and good judgment of the weather against nature.
Although I won't dwell on the many aircraft accidents over the years caused by icing, some of the worst fatal accidents have been caused by icing - principally due to our lack of knowledge, our judgment, and lack of anti-icing equipment. General Aviation (GA) and Commuter type (Part 23) airplanes are the most vulnerable since they are flown at the lower altitudes where icing conditions occur, and most of the airplanes are not equipped with ice-prevention gear or the intention of flight was not to encounter weather conditions.
How, then, does inflight icing occur? Well, we have to be flying in, around, or through stratus and cumulonimbus clouds containing water droplets at or nearing freezing temperatures, and nature takes care of the rest. There can be induction icing - ice forming around the engine air intake (particularly bad for jet engines since ice will form in chunks which may be ingested) or structural icing, either as clear or rime ice, formed when supercooled water droplets impact the wing and control surfaces (top and bottom) freezing in a solid sheet of ice or in a irregular shape - usually between zero degrees and minus 10 degrees centigrade. Such icing has been encountered in a cumulonimbus cloud at temperatures down to minus 25 degrees centigrade. Mixed icing, clear and rime ice, which result in an irregular shape on airfoils, can occur while flying through snow, ice pellets, or small hail.
The effects of ice on the airplane are cumulative - thrust is reduced, drag increases, lift lessens, and weight increases. The combined results are an increase in stall speed and a deterioration of airplane performance. In extreme cases, 2" to 3" of ice can form on the leading edge of an airfoil in less than 5 minutes.
A recent Cessna 208 Caravan accident near Mt. Ranier, Washington, reminds us that icing problems are still with us, in spite of de-icing and anti-icing equipment, along with GPS and digital instruments. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are still investigating.
In Airline and Part 121 flying (all IFR flight plans), cancellations and delays due to icing conditions can cost millions of dollars in one day. The cost of de-icing fluid, at a cost of 3 to 4 dollars/gallon adds to their problems. Part 121 operations covers the transport aircraft icing conditions. Part 135 and 91 flying is covered under 135.227 and 91.527.
NASA, FAA, and NTSB have been conducting research on aircraft icing problems over the years (see applicable icing FAA Advisory Circulars) and as of 6-1-07 the FAA was still working on a proposed rulemaking (Docket #FAA-2007-27654), titled Activation of Ice Protection, applying, principally, to Part 25 Transport Category airplanes. (It is hoped that FAA will follow with Part 23 aircraft). Under the proposal, Aircraft Manufacturers would be required to add an ice-detection and activation system to the present de-ice and anti-ice systems, and mandate that the protection system operate automatically and continuously. I think there is going to be a lot of discussion on this proposal.
How to avoid flying in icing conditions? For GA and Commuter aircraft, use all available weather services and reports to pinpoint icing areas and then plan on avoiding them. If you encounter icing conditions at altitude, use your available de-icing and anti-icing equipment immediately, change altitude up or down, and/or make a change in course (not necessarily 180 degrees since the true direction of the weather system is not known). Leave the autopilot off. Replan your flight or land at the nearest available airport (that will accommodate your airplane) and wait it out.
Proper preflight action includes, on filing an IFR flight plan, determining the freezing level and the levels above and below for weather precipitation areas. If your flight route penetrates the freezing level, request a new altitude or route. Make use of appropriate SIGMETS, AIRMETS, and PIREPS, and any other source of inflight weather advisory in planning and executing en route flight. In general, make a habit of checking FAA Advisory Circulars - FAAs method of advising new developments or action on pertinent problems.
Thanks for listening and Happy Thanksgiving! R.S.
Although I won't dwell on the many aircraft accidents over the years caused by icing, some of the worst fatal accidents have been caused by icing - principally due to our lack of knowledge, our judgment, and lack of anti-icing equipment. General Aviation (GA) and Commuter type (Part 23) airplanes are the most vulnerable since they are flown at the lower altitudes where icing conditions occur, and most of the airplanes are not equipped with ice-prevention gear or the intention of flight was not to encounter weather conditions.
How, then, does inflight icing occur? Well, we have to be flying in, around, or through stratus and cumulonimbus clouds containing water droplets at or nearing freezing temperatures, and nature takes care of the rest. There can be induction icing - ice forming around the engine air intake (particularly bad for jet engines since ice will form in chunks which may be ingested) or structural icing, either as clear or rime ice, formed when supercooled water droplets impact the wing and control surfaces (top and bottom) freezing in a solid sheet of ice or in a irregular shape - usually between zero degrees and minus 10 degrees centigrade. Such icing has been encountered in a cumulonimbus cloud at temperatures down to minus 25 degrees centigrade. Mixed icing, clear and rime ice, which result in an irregular shape on airfoils, can occur while flying through snow, ice pellets, or small hail.
The effects of ice on the airplane are cumulative - thrust is reduced, drag increases, lift lessens, and weight increases. The combined results are an increase in stall speed and a deterioration of airplane performance. In extreme cases, 2" to 3" of ice can form on the leading edge of an airfoil in less than 5 minutes.
A recent Cessna 208 Caravan accident near Mt. Ranier, Washington, reminds us that icing problems are still with us, in spite of de-icing and anti-icing equipment, along with GPS and digital instruments. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are still investigating.
In Airline and Part 121 flying (all IFR flight plans), cancellations and delays due to icing conditions can cost millions of dollars in one day. The cost of de-icing fluid, at a cost of 3 to 4 dollars/gallon adds to their problems. Part 121 operations covers the transport aircraft icing conditions. Part 135 and 91 flying is covered under 135.227 and 91.527.
NASA, FAA, and NTSB have been conducting research on aircraft icing problems over the years (see applicable icing FAA Advisory Circulars) and as of 6-1-07 the FAA was still working on a proposed rulemaking (Docket #FAA-2007-27654), titled Activation of Ice Protection, applying, principally, to Part 25 Transport Category airplanes. (It is hoped that FAA will follow with Part 23 aircraft). Under the proposal, Aircraft Manufacturers would be required to add an ice-detection and activation system to the present de-ice and anti-ice systems, and mandate that the protection system operate automatically and continuously. I think there is going to be a lot of discussion on this proposal.
How to avoid flying in icing conditions? For GA and Commuter aircraft, use all available weather services and reports to pinpoint icing areas and then plan on avoiding them. If you encounter icing conditions at altitude, use your available de-icing and anti-icing equipment immediately, change altitude up or down, and/or make a change in course (not necessarily 180 degrees since the true direction of the weather system is not known). Leave the autopilot off. Replan your flight or land at the nearest available airport (that will accommodate your airplane) and wait it out.
Proper preflight action includes, on filing an IFR flight plan, determining the freezing level and the levels above and below for weather precipitation areas. If your flight route penetrates the freezing level, request a new altitude or route. Make use of appropriate SIGMETS, AIRMETS, and PIREPS, and any other source of inflight weather advisory in planning and executing en route flight. In general, make a habit of checking FAA Advisory Circulars - FAAs method of advising new developments or action on pertinent problems.
Thanks for listening and Happy Thanksgiving! R.S.
Thursday, November 15, 2007
October 2007 aircraft Accident/Incidents
Hi Readers: It time to review the October Accidents/Incidents as reported by NTSB ( There were none reported for Oct 1, 30th, and 31st).
Therewere 74 accidents (4 incidents)( 3 non-U.S. accidents) of which 23 were fatal accidents accounting for 48 fatalities. One fatal accident occurred in Venezuela, accounting for 2 fatalities; one fatal accident occurred in Switzerland, accounting for 2 fatalities; and one Beech D55 accident (1 fatality) occurred near St.Croix, Virgin Islands - apparenty encountering IFR weather. Twenty fatal accidents occurred in the Continental U.S. accounting for 43 fatalities.
There were 4 Incidents during October - one, an Airbus 320 landing at Fargo, North Dakota with the nosegear turned 90 degrees, incurring minor damage; another, an Airbus received minor damage after landing when it struck a runway light at Chicago O'Hare Intl airport. In another incident, classified as a pilot deviation, a Cessna 525 made takeoff from Taxiway M, rather than Runway 36L, at Memphis Intl airport against Controller instructions. In the 4th incident a Bell Helicopter made a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico.
There were 4 balloon landing accidents at Albuquerque, New Mexico - all during the International Balloon Fiesta, and all striking objects on landing (due to wind and gusts) resulting in one fatality, 7 serious injury, and one minor injury.
There was one amateur-built gyroplane accident (one fatal, one serious injury) due to engine failure and resulting in impact with trees. One glider crashed during day VFR maneuvering (one fatal). A formation flight of Yakovlev Yak50 aircraft landing atGillespie Field, El Cajon, CA. resulted in a collision of 2 aircraft on the landing runway; and a Piper PA-32R collided with a Cessna 152 in the traffic pattern at Farmingdale, New York - there were no injuries.
The remaining fatal accidents were a conglomeration of day and night flights - an interesting study of accident causes and safety aspects: To begin, there was a 10-fatal Cessna 208B Caravan propjet on a 402 mile VFR night flight (returning 9 skydivers from a skydiving event near Boise, Idaho to a home base in Shelton, Wa.) that crashed about 45 miles WSW of Yakima, WA. at about 4,300 ft. msl, just south of Mt. Ranier, in IFR weather. There were indications of a rapid descent (6,800 ft/min) from 8,900 ft. and a power-on impact with mountainous terrain at 4,300 ft. msl. Low clouds, misty rain, and low visibility were reported in the area of the accident site, and a hunter in the area observed the aircraft first on horizontal flight, followed by vertical flight. Icing and loss of control were indicated.
The FAA reported that no service was provided to the pilot, there was no flight plan, and there was no record of a preflight or other weather briefing. The report noted VFR weather conditions generally along the route of flight, but IFR conditions in the Cascade mountains and western foothills. There was an AIRMET for icing, low-level turbulence, and mountain obscuration. (I can't imagine a Commercial pilot based at Shelton, Wa. not being clued-in on the weather, in that area, particularly in October). This particular airplane was equipped with analog gauges and digital avionics, including autopilot, GPS, transponder, and de-icing boots. The Mode C transponder was operating and FAA radar was tracking the airplane and observed the target, first at 14,400 ft, then at 13,000 ft, and then 8,900 ft, all in a matter of seconds. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are investigating the accident. In armchair analysis (based on what has been reported), I would have to say, in spite of the analog and digital instrumentation of the airplane, that this pilot demonstrated how not to conduct a VFR night x-c flight.
A second accident (5 fatal) involved a Beech A36 forced landing on takeoff and impact with power lines during variable direction and velocity of high winds and gusts. The aircraft was unable to gain altitude and maintain climb speed. Witnesses reported a rough engine. The pilot was IFR qualified and an IFR flight plan had been filed. Visual flight conditions existed. I wonder if this airplane was overloaded.
The remaining fatal accidents (11) involved an Aero Commander 560F (4 fatal) that impacted terrain after takeoff with a possible engine failure; a Rathyeon C90A (3 fatal) on a night VFR Medical flight which crashed during en route descent; a Cessna 310N (2 fatal) at 13,000 ft in icing conditions with an engine problem; a Cessna 150L (2 fatal), an Instructor and student, impacted terrain during takeoff climb - loss of power and loss of control indicated; a Piper PA-28 (2 fatal) on a night VFR x-c flight encountered IFR conditions and impacted trees and the ground; a Piper PA-28 impacted terrain on a night flight to Las Vegas - encountering IFR conditions; a Piper PA-18 collided with powerlines on a day VFR flight; A Bellanca 7GCBC aircraft crashed on a day VFR x-c flight - an outer wing failure indicated; and another Bellanca 7GCAA crashed due to loss of control following a tailwheel shimmy during a glider-tow operation; an Amateur-built Lambert Variez aircraft crashed during the pilot's test of an installed speed brake; and a Piper PA-18 collided with power lines on a VFR flight.
The October accidents indicate loss of control associated with aircraft and weather factors, along with doubtful flight planning and en route weather knowledge and awareness. Icing conditions, which can appear at any time of the year, seem to be a particular problem to pilots. Knowing the freezing level in weather and how to avoid the icing conditions is of the utmost importance. Pilots should learn how to use all the available weather, and weather-forecasting services, prior to and during en route flight. And, in spite of advanced instrumentation and the services available, pilots will always have to make the decision to fly or stay, or to choose an alternate, or land at the first available airport - and it may not be easy.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Therewere 74 accidents (4 incidents)( 3 non-U.S. accidents) of which 23 were fatal accidents accounting for 48 fatalities. One fatal accident occurred in Venezuela, accounting for 2 fatalities; one fatal accident occurred in Switzerland, accounting for 2 fatalities; and one Beech D55 accident (1 fatality) occurred near St.Croix, Virgin Islands - apparenty encountering IFR weather. Twenty fatal accidents occurred in the Continental U.S. accounting for 43 fatalities.
There were 4 Incidents during October - one, an Airbus 320 landing at Fargo, North Dakota with the nosegear turned 90 degrees, incurring minor damage; another, an Airbus received minor damage after landing when it struck a runway light at Chicago O'Hare Intl airport. In another incident, classified as a pilot deviation, a Cessna 525 made takeoff from Taxiway M, rather than Runway 36L, at Memphis Intl airport against Controller instructions. In the 4th incident a Bell Helicopter made a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico.
There were 4 balloon landing accidents at Albuquerque, New Mexico - all during the International Balloon Fiesta, and all striking objects on landing (due to wind and gusts) resulting in one fatality, 7 serious injury, and one minor injury.
There was one amateur-built gyroplane accident (one fatal, one serious injury) due to engine failure and resulting in impact with trees. One glider crashed during day VFR maneuvering (one fatal). A formation flight of Yakovlev Yak50 aircraft landing atGillespie Field, El Cajon, CA. resulted in a collision of 2 aircraft on the landing runway; and a Piper PA-32R collided with a Cessna 152 in the traffic pattern at Farmingdale, New York - there were no injuries.
The remaining fatal accidents were a conglomeration of day and night flights - an interesting study of accident causes and safety aspects: To begin, there was a 10-fatal Cessna 208B Caravan propjet on a 402 mile VFR night flight (returning 9 skydivers from a skydiving event near Boise, Idaho to a home base in Shelton, Wa.) that crashed about 45 miles WSW of Yakima, WA. at about 4,300 ft. msl, just south of Mt. Ranier, in IFR weather. There were indications of a rapid descent (6,800 ft/min) from 8,900 ft. and a power-on impact with mountainous terrain at 4,300 ft. msl. Low clouds, misty rain, and low visibility were reported in the area of the accident site, and a hunter in the area observed the aircraft first on horizontal flight, followed by vertical flight. Icing and loss of control were indicated.
The FAA reported that no service was provided to the pilot, there was no flight plan, and there was no record of a preflight or other weather briefing. The report noted VFR weather conditions generally along the route of flight, but IFR conditions in the Cascade mountains and western foothills. There was an AIRMET for icing, low-level turbulence, and mountain obscuration. (I can't imagine a Commercial pilot based at Shelton, Wa. not being clued-in on the weather, in that area, particularly in October). This particular airplane was equipped with analog gauges and digital avionics, including autopilot, GPS, transponder, and de-icing boots. The Mode C transponder was operating and FAA radar was tracking the airplane and observed the target, first at 14,400 ft, then at 13,000 ft, and then 8,900 ft, all in a matter of seconds. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are investigating the accident. In armchair analysis (based on what has been reported), I would have to say, in spite of the analog and digital instrumentation of the airplane, that this pilot demonstrated how not to conduct a VFR night x-c flight.
A second accident (5 fatal) involved a Beech A36 forced landing on takeoff and impact with power lines during variable direction and velocity of high winds and gusts. The aircraft was unable to gain altitude and maintain climb speed. Witnesses reported a rough engine. The pilot was IFR qualified and an IFR flight plan had been filed. Visual flight conditions existed. I wonder if this airplane was overloaded.
The remaining fatal accidents (11) involved an Aero Commander 560F (4 fatal) that impacted terrain after takeoff with a possible engine failure; a Rathyeon C90A (3 fatal) on a night VFR Medical flight which crashed during en route descent; a Cessna 310N (2 fatal) at 13,000 ft in icing conditions with an engine problem; a Cessna 150L (2 fatal), an Instructor and student, impacted terrain during takeoff climb - loss of power and loss of control indicated; a Piper PA-28 (2 fatal) on a night VFR x-c flight encountered IFR conditions and impacted trees and the ground; a Piper PA-28 impacted terrain on a night flight to Las Vegas - encountering IFR conditions; a Piper PA-18 collided with powerlines on a day VFR flight; A Bellanca 7GCBC aircraft crashed on a day VFR x-c flight - an outer wing failure indicated; and another Bellanca 7GCAA crashed due to loss of control following a tailwheel shimmy during a glider-tow operation; an Amateur-built Lambert Variez aircraft crashed during the pilot's test of an installed speed brake; and a Piper PA-18 collided with power lines on a VFR flight.
The October accidents indicate loss of control associated with aircraft and weather factors, along with doubtful flight planning and en route weather knowledge and awareness. Icing conditions, which can appear at any time of the year, seem to be a particular problem to pilots. Knowing the freezing level in weather and how to avoid the icing conditions is of the utmost importance. Pilots should learn how to use all the available weather, and weather-forecasting services, prior to and during en route flight. And, in spite of advanced instrumentation and the services available, pilots will always have to make the decision to fly or stay, or to choose an alternate, or land at the first available airport - and it may not be easy.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
Air Travel Eye-opener
Hi Readers: On Sunday, 11-4-07, I caught CNBC's 8-9 PM PST program on TV, Inside American Airlines. Narrated by Peter Greenberg, NBC's travel editor, a week of American's operations across the country was highlighted, pinpointing 18 flights across the country in a Boeing 767 (and one overseas flight) in one week.
The piece covered aspects of air travel problems, including luggage, security, fares, airline costs, fuel costs, and cargo. It was revealed that only 10% of the cargo carried on passenger flights were inspected before flight.
American Airlines carrys 2 million passengers per week and makes 2,000 flights per day.
Peter Greenberg's discourse on the strange science of airline ticketing, frequent flyer miles manipulation, and attempts to keep fuel costs down was particularly interesting.
It was reported that the same program will be repeated on 11-26-07. Watch for it!
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
"Must Learn" Definitions and Facts
Hi Readers: While we're waiting for the count of October 2007 aircraft accidents, here are a few of the "must learn" definitions and facts in flying an airplane of any size. We'll start with airspeed definitions: IAS - indicated airspeed - the number actually read from the airplane airspeed indicator in the cockpit; CAS - calibrated airspeed is the indicated airspeed corrected for position and instrument error; TAS - true airspeed is the speed of an airplane relative to undisturbed air, which is the CAS corrected for altitude, temperature, and compressability; GS - is the speed of an airplane relative to the ground or that speed made good over the ground on a flight, accounting for the direction and velocity of the wind in flight.
Pilots must be familiar with their Airplane Operating Speeds, such as: V1 - normal liftoff speed, V2 - takeoff decision speed, Vr - rotation speed, Va - maneuvering speed, Vc - design cruising speed, Vf - design flap speed, Vfe - maximum flap extend speed, Vle - maximum landing gear extend speed, Vlo - maximum landing gear operating speed, Vmc - minimum control speed with one engine out, Vne - never exceed speed, Vref - final approach speed (1.3 x Vso), Vso - Stall speed, Vx - best angle-of-climb speed (greatest gain of altitude in the shortest horizontal distance), Vy - best rate-of-climb speed (greatest gain in altitude in the shortest possible time).
Standard Weights: Passengers - adults - 170 lbs., children (2-12) - 80 lbs.; Aviation gasoline - 6lbs/gal.; oil - 7.5 lbs/gal; jet fuel - 6.7 lbs/gal; JP-4 fuel - 6.5 lbs/gal.
Loads and Weights: Useful load - difference between takeoff weight and empty weight; Empty Weight - weight of a standard airplane including unuseable fuel, oil and operating fluids; Maximum Takeoff Weight - Highest allowable weight for takeoff; Maximum Landing Weight - highest allowable weight for landing ( in some small airplanes the maximum for both may be the same); Fuel Burn Per Hour - gallons of fuel consumed/hour. Fuel load - useable fuel only.
In addition, the pilot must know the maximum x-wind component for the airplane, which is given in knots; and where to find the useable fuel in gallons, which is usually placarded adjacent to the fuel filler caps.
The Fuel Grades and Colors are as follows: 80 octane - red, 100 octane - green, 100LL octane - blue, 115 octane - purple (for military use), jet fuel - clear or straw-colored.
General Aviation (GA) will use about 268 million gallons of aviation gas and about 1.5 million gallons of jet fuel in 2007. Air Carrier (AC) will use about 20 million gallons of jet fuel in 2007.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Pilots must be familiar with their Airplane Operating Speeds, such as: V1 - normal liftoff speed, V2 - takeoff decision speed, Vr - rotation speed, Va - maneuvering speed, Vc - design cruising speed, Vf - design flap speed, Vfe - maximum flap extend speed, Vle - maximum landing gear extend speed, Vlo - maximum landing gear operating speed, Vmc - minimum control speed with one engine out, Vne - never exceed speed, Vref - final approach speed (1.3 x Vso), Vso - Stall speed, Vx - best angle-of-climb speed (greatest gain of altitude in the shortest horizontal distance), Vy - best rate-of-climb speed (greatest gain in altitude in the shortest possible time).
Standard Weights: Passengers - adults - 170 lbs., children (2-12) - 80 lbs.; Aviation gasoline - 6lbs/gal.; oil - 7.5 lbs/gal; jet fuel - 6.7 lbs/gal; JP-4 fuel - 6.5 lbs/gal.
Loads and Weights: Useful load - difference between takeoff weight and empty weight; Empty Weight - weight of a standard airplane including unuseable fuel, oil and operating fluids; Maximum Takeoff Weight - Highest allowable weight for takeoff; Maximum Landing Weight - highest allowable weight for landing ( in some small airplanes the maximum for both may be the same); Fuel Burn Per Hour - gallons of fuel consumed/hour. Fuel load - useable fuel only.
In addition, the pilot must know the maximum x-wind component for the airplane, which is given in knots; and where to find the useable fuel in gallons, which is usually placarded adjacent to the fuel filler caps.
The Fuel Grades and Colors are as follows: 80 octane - red, 100 octane - green, 100LL octane - blue, 115 octane - purple (for military use), jet fuel - clear or straw-colored.
General Aviation (GA) will use about 268 million gallons of aviation gas and about 1.5 million gallons of jet fuel in 2007. Air Carrier (AC) will use about 20 million gallons of jet fuel in 2007.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Sunday, October 28, 2007
Did You Know
Hi Readers: This is October 28, 2007-Did you know day.
The Earth - The earth is the third planet from the sun, and the largest of all the terrestrial planets in our solar system.
Sputnik - At the time of sputnick, in 1937, there was just one undersea telephone cable connecting the U.S. with Europe, carrying only 36 simultaneous calls. Today, fiber-optic cables and communications satellites make long distance calls routine.
Meteorology - The atmosphere transports insects, pollutants, sand, bacteria, and viruses between continents. Sand, for instance, from the Chinese desert rountinely rains down on the West Coast of the U.S., bringing microbes with it.
Inflation - The idea of using "a basket of goods" to measure inflation goes back to the Revolutionary War. Massachusetts paid it's soldiers the amount of money that would buy the following basket of goods: 5 bushels of corn, 68 and 4/7 pounds of beef, 10 pounds of wood, and 16 pounds of leather.
The Color of Stars - The surface temperature of a star determines it's color. The hottest stars are bluish in color, the coldest are reddish. Stars at intermediate temperatures appear white. Would you believe that the sun is a white star?
The October aircraft accident accounting is coming up. Thanks for listening. R.S.
The Earth - The earth is the third planet from the sun, and the largest of all the terrestrial planets in our solar system.
Sputnik - At the time of sputnick, in 1937, there was just one undersea telephone cable connecting the U.S. with Europe, carrying only 36 simultaneous calls. Today, fiber-optic cables and communications satellites make long distance calls routine.
Meteorology - The atmosphere transports insects, pollutants, sand, bacteria, and viruses between continents. Sand, for instance, from the Chinese desert rountinely rains down on the West Coast of the U.S., bringing microbes with it.
Inflation - The idea of using "a basket of goods" to measure inflation goes back to the Revolutionary War. Massachusetts paid it's soldiers the amount of money that would buy the following basket of goods: 5 bushels of corn, 68 and 4/7 pounds of beef, 10 pounds of wood, and 16 pounds of leather.
The Color of Stars - The surface temperature of a star determines it's color. The hottest stars are bluish in color, the coldest are reddish. Stars at intermediate temperatures appear white. Would you believe that the sun is a white star?
The October aircraft accident accounting is coming up. Thanks for listening. R.S.
Saturday, October 27, 2007
The California Fires
With several fires still burning in Southern California on Saturday, 10-27-07, the horrible tradegy is still on our minds, and the aftermath is just starting. Before the mass exodus of volunteers and equipment and the rebuilding gets underway, let's thank all the firefighters, forestry people, pilots, volunteers, care-givers, and donors that brought it all to an end.
We all saw it on TV, spectacular, but heart-breaking, and we felt for the animals. But they were cared for, too. In my time, this was the worst fire I've ever seen. The volunteer of people and equipment from other States was fantastic. Even volunteer firefighters from Mexico, too. GA airports were being used as bases and staging areas for both ground and air firefighting operations.
It was a sight to see all the tankers dropping slurry and water on the high-rising flames and smoke, all against fierce Santa Ana winds. Department of Homeland Security Kerchoff reported on the fires, citing 90 tanker airplanes and helicopters of all sizes, operating from various airports and bases. There were Grumman S-2 airtankers, UH-1H Super Huey helicopters, the OV-10As from the Dept of Forestry, C-130 aircraft tankers, and a DC-10 air tanker. Firefighters came from all across the Country to help.
The aftermath and the recovery, I'm sure, will continue for months. The damage to property was estimated in excess of $ 1 Billion dollars. The damage to human suffering is unthinkable. What can be done to prevent the fires from happening in the future - it's going to take a lot of thought and planning from everyone. Let's start by getting rid of the arsonists promptly. The weather - we'll have to mediate.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
We all saw it on TV, spectacular, but heart-breaking, and we felt for the animals. But they were cared for, too. In my time, this was the worst fire I've ever seen. The volunteer of people and equipment from other States was fantastic. Even volunteer firefighters from Mexico, too. GA airports were being used as bases and staging areas for both ground and air firefighting operations.
It was a sight to see all the tankers dropping slurry and water on the high-rising flames and smoke, all against fierce Santa Ana winds. Department of Homeland Security Kerchoff reported on the fires, citing 90 tanker airplanes and helicopters of all sizes, operating from various airports and bases. There were Grumman S-2 airtankers, UH-1H Super Huey helicopters, the OV-10As from the Dept of Forestry, C-130 aircraft tankers, and a DC-10 air tanker. Firefighters came from all across the Country to help.
The aftermath and the recovery, I'm sure, will continue for months. The damage to property was estimated in excess of $ 1 Billion dollars. The damage to human suffering is unthinkable. What can be done to prevent the fires from happening in the future - it's going to take a lot of thought and planning from everyone. Let's start by getting rid of the arsonists promptly. The weather - we'll have to mediate.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Thursday, October 25, 2007
Temporary Flight Restrictions
Hi Readers: When you buy a bottle of 80-proof liquor, do you really know what you are getting? Yes, it would be alcohol. Distillers say that in "colonel times", if liquor were put on gunpowder and it burned, that it was "proved" or "proof" that alcohol was really in the liquor. Thus, the formula: 1/2 of 1% of each unit of liquor = the alcohol in it. 1/2 of 1% x 80 proof = 40% alcohol. 100 proof would contain 50% alcohol. Now for an important and appropo topic:
In view of the many airshows across the country and the numerous fires concentrated in one area in California, and the NASA space operations, this is probably a good time to discuss Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR). Okay, so what is a TFR and why is it so important?
There are many reasons, as given by FAA, for the TFRs: 1. To protect persons and property from an existing or iminent hazard associated with an incident on the surface when the presence of low flying aircraft would magnify, alter, spread or compound that hazard. 2. Provide a safe environment for the operation of disaster relief aircraft. 3. Prevent an unsafe congestion of sightseeing aircraft above an incident or event which may generate a high degree of public interest. 4. Protect declared national disasters for humanitarian reasons in the state of Hawaii. 5. Protect the President, Vice President, or other public figures of the U.S. 6. Provide a safe environment for Space Agency operations. Aerial Demonstrations and major Sporting Events are included in this classification.
You can imagine the importance of the TFR with respect to the California fires, concentrated from San Diego to Santa Barbara and into the most populated areas of Los Angeles, involving air drop operations and movement of firefighters by helicopter. You can see that no other flight activity be allowed during this time, into, around, or out of the area. The visit of the President on Thursday, 10-25-07, to view the area, makes a TFR all the more important.
How are we advised of the TFRs - by Notices To Airmen (NOTAMs) that are issued almost daily. Infact, the NOTAM system was designed to disseminate time-critical aeronautical information of either a temporary nature or not sufficiently known in advance to permit publication on charts or other operational publications.
NOTAM information is aeronautical information that could affect a pilot's decision to make a flight; such as airport or runway closures; changes in the status of navigational aids; ILS's; radar service availability; and other information essential to planned en route, terminal, or landing operations.
NOTAM information is transmitted using standard contractions to reduce transmission time. The information is classified by categories: NOTAM D (distant), NOTAM L (local), and Flight Data Center (FDC), Each of these NOTAM categories are important to the pilot, depending on the nature of the reason for the NOTAM. NOTAMs are a study in themselves, covering many categories and operational complications.
One of the requirements of a proposed flight is checking the appropriate NOTAMs, normally through an automated Flight Service Station (AFSS), a local FSS, or any navigational facility, or perhaps an organization such as AOPA or Others accepting Flight Plan Filings. It is recommended that pilots consult a FSS briefer to discuss recent and current NOTAMs before filing a flight plan.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
In view of the many airshows across the country and the numerous fires concentrated in one area in California, and the NASA space operations, this is probably a good time to discuss Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR). Okay, so what is a TFR and why is it so important?
There are many reasons, as given by FAA, for the TFRs: 1. To protect persons and property from an existing or iminent hazard associated with an incident on the surface when the presence of low flying aircraft would magnify, alter, spread or compound that hazard. 2. Provide a safe environment for the operation of disaster relief aircraft. 3. Prevent an unsafe congestion of sightseeing aircraft above an incident or event which may generate a high degree of public interest. 4. Protect declared national disasters for humanitarian reasons in the state of Hawaii. 5. Protect the President, Vice President, or other public figures of the U.S. 6. Provide a safe environment for Space Agency operations. Aerial Demonstrations and major Sporting Events are included in this classification.
You can imagine the importance of the TFR with respect to the California fires, concentrated from San Diego to Santa Barbara and into the most populated areas of Los Angeles, involving air drop operations and movement of firefighters by helicopter. You can see that no other flight activity be allowed during this time, into, around, or out of the area. The visit of the President on Thursday, 10-25-07, to view the area, makes a TFR all the more important.
How are we advised of the TFRs - by Notices To Airmen (NOTAMs) that are issued almost daily. Infact, the NOTAM system was designed to disseminate time-critical aeronautical information of either a temporary nature or not sufficiently known in advance to permit publication on charts or other operational publications.
NOTAM information is aeronautical information that could affect a pilot's decision to make a flight; such as airport or runway closures; changes in the status of navigational aids; ILS's; radar service availability; and other information essential to planned en route, terminal, or landing operations.
NOTAM information is transmitted using standard contractions to reduce transmission time. The information is classified by categories: NOTAM D (distant), NOTAM L (local), and Flight Data Center (FDC), Each of these NOTAM categories are important to the pilot, depending on the nature of the reason for the NOTAM. NOTAMs are a study in themselves, covering many categories and operational complications.
One of the requirements of a proposed flight is checking the appropriate NOTAMs, normally through an automated Flight Service Station (AFSS), a local FSS, or any navigational facility, or perhaps an organization such as AOPA or Others accepting Flight Plan Filings. It is recommended that pilots consult a FSS briefer to discuss recent and current NOTAMs before filing a flight plan.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
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Thursday, October 18, 2007
In Between
Hi Readers: I came across this Nonsense Poetry (?) in searching my voluminous files for my next subject.
Every Now and Then
Every now and then, a story unfolds,
a story never to be told,
To good to keep, it finds its way,
to ears of utter dismay.
Its secrecy is sworn, but not well-worn,
and the story passes along its way.
As it came to me, I could easily see,
this story must not further be.
The Flapping Machine
The dreams of men are often extreme,
some pleasurable, some mean,
Yet, always leading to progress.
Such was the case of E. Van Cleeve,
who invented the flapping machine.
Extreme it was, highly useful, one and the same,
that flapping machine became the helicopter.
Every Now and Then
Every now and then, a story unfolds,
a story never to be told,
To good to keep, it finds its way,
to ears of utter dismay.
Its secrecy is sworn, but not well-worn,
and the story passes along its way.
As it came to me, I could easily see,
this story must not further be.
The Flapping Machine
The dreams of men are often extreme,
some pleasurable, some mean,
Yet, always leading to progress.
Such was the case of E. Van Cleeve,
who invented the flapping machine.
Extreme it was, highly useful, one and the same,
that flapping machine became the helicopter.
Sunday, October 14, 2007
September 2007 Aircraft Accidents/Incidents
Hi Readers: Its time to review the September Accident/Incidents as reported by NTSB. There were 98 accidents and 2 incidents (7 non-U.S. accidents) of which 36 were fatal accidents accounting for 134 fatalities.
One incident was a Part 121 Air Carrier DC-9 engine fire warning in flight, and the other was a night VFR incident in which the Tower Controller instructed a Part 135 Lear Jet pilot to taxi into position and hold on R19R at Potomac airport in Washington D.C. Runway 19R was actually closed and the runway lights were off. The runway closure was advertised on ATIS and the closure was placed on the ground radar display in the Tower. The Tower Controller then cleared the pilot for takeoff. The FAA classified the incident as an operational error.
The September accidents, particularly the fatal accidents, show a conglomeration of accident types and indicated probable causes. There were 8 takeoff accidents (3 engine failures, 5 stalls or failure to clear trees and terrain); 9 loss of control and/or maneuvering at low altitude, including spin-ins; a collision of 2 airplanes, and a loss of control of one airplane, during the Reno, Nevada Air Races; one inflight collision with mountains; one flying into a thunderstorm and a crash shedding airplane parts; one formation-demonstration crash; 3 unknowns; one helicopter tail boom and rotor failure inflight; one where the passenger walked into the main rotor; and the accident involving Steve Fossett (never found). There was one GPS approach accident - a second attempt in a 100 ft overcast, with 1/4 mile visibility, and a zero temperature-dewpoint spread, resulting in 3 fatalities.
One fatality, and one serious injury, U.S. Customs accident, practising touch-an-go maneuvers, attempting a full-flap, short field landing, involved dropping the airplane in to the runway (10-12 ft.) and a bounce airborne, then a drift to the right of the runway centerline. The pilot applied power, resulting in a 30 to 40 ft pitchup and stall, further resulting in impact with terrain in a nose-low attitude and following fire. ( A typical example of how not to land an airplane)
One accident indicated an overload of the airplane on takeoff, resulting in 5 fatalities.
In general, we must conclude that the sum total of the accidents reflect carelessness, failure to follow the rules, poor decisions, and poor judgment. These accidents show deviation from safety of flight, and the type of accidents we would like to prevent. Also, unfortuneately, the type of accidents most likely to result in fatalities.
The poor judgment accidents continue for lack of knowledge and training. The poor planning and poor decision accidents we can correct, particularly those accidents involving X-C flight and weather. The carelessness and recklessness - Pilots must follow the rules.
We can attack the safety aspects of flying by separations, such as: 1. Local and X-C flight; 2. Pilot experience - flight hours, certificates, and proficiency issues; 3. Pilot - aircraft type certification; 4. VFR - IFR flying; 5.Rules and Regulations; 6. Aeronautical knowledge.
Supposedly we are doing this now - so what are we doing wrong?
Thanks for listening. R.S.
One incident was a Part 121 Air Carrier DC-9 engine fire warning in flight, and the other was a night VFR incident in which the Tower Controller instructed a Part 135 Lear Jet pilot to taxi into position and hold on R19R at Potomac airport in Washington D.C. Runway 19R was actually closed and the runway lights were off. The runway closure was advertised on ATIS and the closure was placed on the ground radar display in the Tower. The Tower Controller then cleared the pilot for takeoff. The FAA classified the incident as an operational error.
The September accidents, particularly the fatal accidents, show a conglomeration of accident types and indicated probable causes. There were 8 takeoff accidents (3 engine failures, 5 stalls or failure to clear trees and terrain); 9 loss of control and/or maneuvering at low altitude, including spin-ins; a collision of 2 airplanes, and a loss of control of one airplane, during the Reno, Nevada Air Races; one inflight collision with mountains; one flying into a thunderstorm and a crash shedding airplane parts; one formation-demonstration crash; 3 unknowns; one helicopter tail boom and rotor failure inflight; one where the passenger walked into the main rotor; and the accident involving Steve Fossett (never found). There was one GPS approach accident - a second attempt in a 100 ft overcast, with 1/4 mile visibility, and a zero temperature-dewpoint spread, resulting in 3 fatalities.
One fatality, and one serious injury, U.S. Customs accident, practising touch-an-go maneuvers, attempting a full-flap, short field landing, involved dropping the airplane in to the runway (10-12 ft.) and a bounce airborne, then a drift to the right of the runway centerline. The pilot applied power, resulting in a 30 to 40 ft pitchup and stall, further resulting in impact with terrain in a nose-low attitude and following fire. ( A typical example of how not to land an airplane)
One accident indicated an overload of the airplane on takeoff, resulting in 5 fatalities.
In general, we must conclude that the sum total of the accidents reflect carelessness, failure to follow the rules, poor decisions, and poor judgment. These accidents show deviation from safety of flight, and the type of accidents we would like to prevent. Also, unfortuneately, the type of accidents most likely to result in fatalities.
The poor judgment accidents continue for lack of knowledge and training. The poor planning and poor decision accidents we can correct, particularly those accidents involving X-C flight and weather. The carelessness and recklessness - Pilots must follow the rules.
We can attack the safety aspects of flying by separations, such as: 1. Local and X-C flight; 2. Pilot experience - flight hours, certificates, and proficiency issues; 3. Pilot - aircraft type certification; 4. VFR - IFR flying; 5.Rules and Regulations; 6. Aeronautical knowledge.
Supposedly we are doing this now - so what are we doing wrong?
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Friday, October 12, 2007
Bits and Pieces
Hi Readers: The current cost of 100LL aviation fuel is $4.52/gal and Jet A fuel is $4.27/gal.
FAA is now pushing pilots to upgrade their electronics to include ADS-B, Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast for the future. Although the target date for full operation is the year 2020, it will take a while and some dollars.
As if we didn't have enough advertising in our lives, I learned from AVWEB, an aviation information source, that the AD - AIR company in London is selling 5-acre inflatable ads that lay across the landscape to be seen from the air by passengers of Airlines in flight. Atlanta, Denver, and Los Angeles Intl airports are target possibilities. I wish them luck in finding a 5-acre lot near Los Ageles Intl. What will we think of next?
BRS, Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc., manufacturers of whole aircraft parachute systems (such as installed on the Sirius airplane), seatbelts and airbags for automobiles, etc. is now advertising their products for the Cessna 172/182 airplanes, and Experimental and Sports airplanes. Cessna will have the equipment installed in the Skycatcher airplane. The product, a ballistic type charge, has been available for some time, with a deployment speed from 138 mph to over 200 mph, and at an estimated cost from $2,608 to $17,881. This could be a boon for GA safety if all goes well.
GA aircraft accidents show that even high-time Commercial and Air Transport pilots need knowledge and training in selecting and analyzing Weather Services reports in connection with their flight planning. The desired X-C flight level, or changes in flight level, direct flight and alternate routes, below clouds or over-the-top flight, cloud ceilings ahead, hazardous weather en route and at destination, and en route accounts of destination weather are some of the important needs revealed. Avoiding precipitation areas and icing levels are a must in the X-C flight planning. The leading contributing factor in GA accidents is the weather, and takeoff is really only the beginning of the flight plan.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
FAA is now pushing pilots to upgrade their electronics to include ADS-B, Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast for the future. Although the target date for full operation is the year 2020, it will take a while and some dollars.
As if we didn't have enough advertising in our lives, I learned from AVWEB, an aviation information source, that the AD - AIR company in London is selling 5-acre inflatable ads that lay across the landscape to be seen from the air by passengers of Airlines in flight. Atlanta, Denver, and Los Angeles Intl airports are target possibilities. I wish them luck in finding a 5-acre lot near Los Ageles Intl. What will we think of next?
BRS, Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc., manufacturers of whole aircraft parachute systems (such as installed on the Sirius airplane), seatbelts and airbags for automobiles, etc. is now advertising their products for the Cessna 172/182 airplanes, and Experimental and Sports airplanes. Cessna will have the equipment installed in the Skycatcher airplane. The product, a ballistic type charge, has been available for some time, with a deployment speed from 138 mph to over 200 mph, and at an estimated cost from $2,608 to $17,881. This could be a boon for GA safety if all goes well.
GA aircraft accidents show that even high-time Commercial and Air Transport pilots need knowledge and training in selecting and analyzing Weather Services reports in connection with their flight planning. The desired X-C flight level, or changes in flight level, direct flight and alternate routes, below clouds or over-the-top flight, cloud ceilings ahead, hazardous weather en route and at destination, and en route accounts of destination weather are some of the important needs revealed. Avoiding precipitation areas and icing levels are a must in the X-C flight planning. The leading contributing factor in GA accidents is the weather, and takeoff is really only the beginning of the flight plan.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Wind Shear - Part II
My preliminary study of the weather-related aircraft accidents and incidents indicate, still, a general lack of awareness of wind shear and it's ramifications by all pilots, particularly by GA pilots, and pertaining to low altitude and surface operations in and around airports. By the nature of their operations, airline pilots are better informed and also supported by their Company training and cockpit detection equipment.
NASA, FAA, and NTSB have spent considerable effort in identifying, defining, and investigating microbursts and wind shear since 1985. To date the awareness of wind shear and the detection by pilots is still only general and is complicated by the required use of several weather systems to detect (which must be secured by the pilot separately) and which must be dispersed to the pilot through the Controller.
As pointed out in Wind Shear I, over the years the airlines have experienced the major catastrofic accidents in connection with wind shear. NTSB, following their investigations have faulted, mainly, the crews for initiating and continuing flight into the related microburst and rainshaft emanating from the thunderstorms. The contributing causes, however, (as they often do) appear to be the root of the problem - the lack of specific guidelines, procedures, and training for avoiding the end result, that of wind shear.
We also know that there have been occurrences of wind shear experienced by GA pilots on VFR and IFR flights. Fortuneately, most were handled successfully. Considering the current volume of flying, and expected increase in the future, it is my opinion (in the interest of safety) that the need exists for a simplified system of wind shear detection and avoidance in the cockpit. Such a system must be capable of relieving the pilot and the controller of excess duties.
For the time being, and until Avionics manufacturers, FAA, and others settle on an affordable cockpit wind shear detection instrument, for both airline and GA operations, the best advice appears to be: 1. Do not fly into and through thunderstorms, if at all possible; particularly through the thunderstorm rainshaft, and during low altitude operations such as approach, landing, and takeoff. 2. Check the en route and destination weather thoroghlybefore flight using the IWAS, LLWAS, TDWR, WSP systems for wind shear. 3. When in doubt, talk to the appropriate controller regarding hazardous weather ahead in flight. 4. Then adjust your flight plans accordingly - don't wait! Thanks for listening. R.S.
NASA, FAA, and NTSB have spent considerable effort in identifying, defining, and investigating microbursts and wind shear since 1985. To date the awareness of wind shear and the detection by pilots is still only general and is complicated by the required use of several weather systems to detect (which must be secured by the pilot separately) and which must be dispersed to the pilot through the Controller.
As pointed out in Wind Shear I, over the years the airlines have experienced the major catastrofic accidents in connection with wind shear. NTSB, following their investigations have faulted, mainly, the crews for initiating and continuing flight into the related microburst and rainshaft emanating from the thunderstorms. The contributing causes, however, (as they often do) appear to be the root of the problem - the lack of specific guidelines, procedures, and training for avoiding the end result, that of wind shear.
We also know that there have been occurrences of wind shear experienced by GA pilots on VFR and IFR flights. Fortuneately, most were handled successfully. Considering the current volume of flying, and expected increase in the future, it is my opinion (in the interest of safety) that the need exists for a simplified system of wind shear detection and avoidance in the cockpit. Such a system must be capable of relieving the pilot and the controller of excess duties.
For the time being, and until Avionics manufacturers, FAA, and others settle on an affordable cockpit wind shear detection instrument, for both airline and GA operations, the best advice appears to be: 1. Do not fly into and through thunderstorms, if at all possible; particularly through the thunderstorm rainshaft, and during low altitude operations such as approach, landing, and takeoff. 2. Check the en route and destination weather thoroghlybefore flight using the IWAS, LLWAS, TDWR, WSP systems for wind shear. 3. When in doubt, talk to the appropriate controller regarding hazardous weather ahead in flight. 4. Then adjust your flight plans accordingly - don't wait! Thanks for listening. R.S.
Friday, September 28, 2007
Wind Shear - Part I
Hi Readers: Did you know that you can tell how far away a thunderstorm is from your position? Follow the lightning you see, count the seconds until you hear thunder. Then multiply your seconds times 1,128 - the speed of sound in ft/sec.
Moving on to Wind Shear. The subject, not all that well known to pilots and operators; and probably one of the most studied weather-related occurrences over the years, yet remaining highly misunderstood. In fact, the awareness factor is alarming. We have only to follow the thunderstorm and tornado reports, those originating from tropical air in the Southwest moving across the South and Midwest of the U.S., and the increased frequency of these storms in the past several years to find the source of our wind shear. Not that it doesn't occur in other areas of the world.
Wind shear is one of the more important weather-related occurrences, convective-type initiations; separate and distinct from known air turbulence, wake turbulence, mountain wave, jetwash, etc., that we should be aware of and include in our flight planning. Wind shear is directly related to downdrafts, microbursts, and convective vortex movements of air. The simple definition of wind shear is a sudden, drastic shift in winds speed, direction, or both in a horizontal and vertical plane. It's dangerous at any altitude, and particularly during surface operations such as approach, landing and takeoff. It can happen in airline or GA operations, VFR or IFR conditions, notably in connection with a cumulo-nimbus cloud or a thunderstorm.
Our cognizance of the hazards of wind shear must become full blown - the suddenness, the safety, and the fatal aspects are alarming; and the size and extent of the hazards are strictly after the fact.
Let's start with the accepted fact that wind shear per se is hazardous and dangerous to flight by fact and experience. And, by nature, it is associated with convective air movements such as a thunderstorm, a cumulo-nimbus cloud, rain, a snowstorm, and downdrafts producing a microburst of air which sets up the wind shear and ends in a general flattening to the surface with vortex movements at each end. The total effects to airplane control are not instantaneous and can continue and progress from one stage to another; such as an increase or decrease of windspeed, which affects the airplane airspeed, and causes pitch control problems. The wind shear, as analyzed, is actually the result of the strong downdraft of air out of the center of the storm, called the rainshaft (rain or virga). This downdraft, or microburst of air, contacting the surface, then spreads out as much as 5 miles or more, horizontally and vertically, terminated by inward and upward moving vortices ( as explained before). It is estimated that 5% of all thunderstorms produce a microburst.
Indications in the cockpit to detect the microburst and wind shear seem to be the sudden airspeed variation, and the amount, a sudden pitch change, heavy turbulence, and a tendency to yaw or roll. The extent of the occurrence is, of course, unpredictable.
Airline encounters of wind shear have been on approach to land, landing, and takeoff. The typical approach occurrence is best illustrated by a 1985 encounter by Delta Air Lines, Flt 191, an L-1011 airplane, approaching the Dallas-Ft.Worth Intl airport, flying through a thunderstorm rainshaft, in which the developing microburst forced a landing short of the runway, resulting in fire and fatalities.
In another occurrence in 1999, American Air Lines Flt 1420, in attempting a landing at night at Little Rock, Arkansas, flew into a severe thunderstorm and crosswind, losing complete control. Similar circumstances to the Delta encounter occurred.
The typical takeoff and climb situations, encountering a microburst, resulting in wind shear, have similar cockpit indications, pitch control problems, and prevention of adequate climb past the runway.
Wind Shear - PartII will follow with Analysis.
Moving on to Wind Shear. The subject, not all that well known to pilots and operators; and probably one of the most studied weather-related occurrences over the years, yet remaining highly misunderstood. In fact, the awareness factor is alarming. We have only to follow the thunderstorm and tornado reports, those originating from tropical air in the Southwest moving across the South and Midwest of the U.S., and the increased frequency of these storms in the past several years to find the source of our wind shear. Not that it doesn't occur in other areas of the world.
Wind shear is one of the more important weather-related occurrences, convective-type initiations; separate and distinct from known air turbulence, wake turbulence, mountain wave, jetwash, etc., that we should be aware of and include in our flight planning. Wind shear is directly related to downdrafts, microbursts, and convective vortex movements of air. The simple definition of wind shear is a sudden, drastic shift in winds speed, direction, or both in a horizontal and vertical plane. It's dangerous at any altitude, and particularly during surface operations such as approach, landing and takeoff. It can happen in airline or GA operations, VFR or IFR conditions, notably in connection with a cumulo-nimbus cloud or a thunderstorm.
Our cognizance of the hazards of wind shear must become full blown - the suddenness, the safety, and the fatal aspects are alarming; and the size and extent of the hazards are strictly after the fact.
Let's start with the accepted fact that wind shear per se is hazardous and dangerous to flight by fact and experience. And, by nature, it is associated with convective air movements such as a thunderstorm, a cumulo-nimbus cloud, rain, a snowstorm, and downdrafts producing a microburst of air which sets up the wind shear and ends in a general flattening to the surface with vortex movements at each end. The total effects to airplane control are not instantaneous and can continue and progress from one stage to another; such as an increase or decrease of windspeed, which affects the airplane airspeed, and causes pitch control problems. The wind shear, as analyzed, is actually the result of the strong downdraft of air out of the center of the storm, called the rainshaft (rain or virga). This downdraft, or microburst of air, contacting the surface, then spreads out as much as 5 miles or more, horizontally and vertically, terminated by inward and upward moving vortices ( as explained before). It is estimated that 5% of all thunderstorms produce a microburst.
Indications in the cockpit to detect the microburst and wind shear seem to be the sudden airspeed variation, and the amount, a sudden pitch change, heavy turbulence, and a tendency to yaw or roll. The extent of the occurrence is, of course, unpredictable.
Airline encounters of wind shear have been on approach to land, landing, and takeoff. The typical approach occurrence is best illustrated by a 1985 encounter by Delta Air Lines, Flt 191, an L-1011 airplane, approaching the Dallas-Ft.Worth Intl airport, flying through a thunderstorm rainshaft, in which the developing microburst forced a landing short of the runway, resulting in fire and fatalities.
In another occurrence in 1999, American Air Lines Flt 1420, in attempting a landing at night at Little Rock, Arkansas, flew into a severe thunderstorm and crosswind, losing complete control. Similar circumstances to the Delta encounter occurred.
The typical takeoff and climb situations, encountering a microburst, resulting in wind shear, have similar cockpit indications, pitch control problems, and prevention of adequate climb past the runway.
Wind Shear - PartII will follow with Analysis.
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Monday, September 17, 2007
July - August 2007 Aircraft Accidents
Hi Readers: Back from the hospital - a huge bit of vertigo and a spiking blood pressure caught me unawares. Now I'll finish what I started. Looks like July and August 2007 were two months of aircraft accidents and incidents indicating some very bad judgment and failure to follow the rules. The weather played a part, too. NTSB is still investigating.
There were 72 aircraft accidents and 5 incidents in August compared to 199 accidents and 3 incidents in July. The fatal accidents in August totaled 26, with 55 fatalities, compared to 39 fatal accidents, with 73 fatalities (not including the Brazilian airline fiasco, taking 186 lives) in July.
The record for August indicates an improvement until we look at the type and nature of the accidents. And, as we go along, we'll keep in mind the question, "could these accidents and incidents have been prevented?". Although it will take a detailed study and review to know why and how, the answer, of course, is a resounding yes.
The flying hours for each month, which at this point would still be estimated, would indicate a slight increase in the accident rate. The incidents and the fatal accidents, however, give us the insight that we need, since the incident is the beginning of an accident and the fatal accident has reached and passed its reality.
Without going into the details, both the July and August incidents indicated pilot error, local and ground control errors, as well as poor coordination in the taxi, takeoff, and landing operations. All of the operations occured in daylight and during VFR conditions.
The July and August accidents occured worldwide, with the majority being in the continental U.S., with Alaska accounting for 8 accidents in July and 11 accidents in August.
The fatal accidents, particularly in Alaska, are revealing of multiple errors:
Weather Involved: July 2007 - 9 , August 2007 - 4
Pilot Error (Loss of control, etc.): Jul - 13 ; Aug 9
Engine Failure: Jul - 1 ; Aug 2
Experimental / Amateur failures: Jul 1 ; Aug - 5
Unknown / Unreported: Jul - 10 ; Aug - 2
Inflight Fire: Jul 1 ; Aug - 0
Medical Flight: Jul - 1 ; Aug - 1
Suicide: Jul - 0 ; Aug - 1
Uncertificated Flight: Jul - 0; Aug - 1
Helicopter tail rotor failure: Jul - 1 ; Aug - 1
Helicopter collision: Jul - 1 ; Aug - 0
The collision of 2 TV Channel news helicopters in Phoenix, AZ while watching a police persuit on the ground, as unusual as it was, showed inattention in flight and poor coordination of operations (in fact there were a total of five helicopters in the air in the same operation).
There were two fatal Part 135 sightseeing tour accidents out of Ketchikan, Alaska, one in July and one in August, both DeHavilland DHC-2 aircraft. Both directly involving VFR operations in IFR conditions of rain, fog, low clouds, and strong downdrafts. The July accident resulted in 5 fatalities and 4 serious injuries, and the August accident in 5 fatalities.
We will hope for better results in September. Thanks for listening.
RS
There were 72 aircraft accidents and 5 incidents in August compared to 199 accidents and 3 incidents in July. The fatal accidents in August totaled 26, with 55 fatalities, compared to 39 fatal accidents, with 73 fatalities (not including the Brazilian airline fiasco, taking 186 lives) in July.
The record for August indicates an improvement until we look at the type and nature of the accidents. And, as we go along, we'll keep in mind the question, "could these accidents and incidents have been prevented?". Although it will take a detailed study and review to know why and how, the answer, of course, is a resounding yes.
The flying hours for each month, which at this point would still be estimated, would indicate a slight increase in the accident rate. The incidents and the fatal accidents, however, give us the insight that we need, since the incident is the beginning of an accident and the fatal accident has reached and passed its reality.
Without going into the details, both the July and August incidents indicated pilot error, local and ground control errors, as well as poor coordination in the taxi, takeoff, and landing operations. All of the operations occured in daylight and during VFR conditions.
The July and August accidents occured worldwide, with the majority being in the continental U.S., with Alaska accounting for 8 accidents in July and 11 accidents in August.
The fatal accidents, particularly in Alaska, are revealing of multiple errors:
Weather Involved: July 2007 - 9 , August 2007 - 4
Pilot Error (Loss of control, etc.): Jul - 13 ; Aug 9
Engine Failure: Jul - 1 ; Aug 2
Experimental / Amateur failures: Jul 1 ; Aug - 5
Unknown / Unreported: Jul - 10 ; Aug - 2
Inflight Fire: Jul 1 ; Aug - 0
Medical Flight: Jul - 1 ; Aug - 1
Suicide: Jul - 0 ; Aug - 1
Uncertificated Flight: Jul - 0; Aug - 1
Helicopter tail rotor failure: Jul - 1 ; Aug - 1
Helicopter collision: Jul - 1 ; Aug - 0
The collision of 2 TV Channel news helicopters in Phoenix, AZ while watching a police persuit on the ground, as unusual as it was, showed inattention in flight and poor coordination of operations (in fact there were a total of five helicopters in the air in the same operation).
There were two fatal Part 135 sightseeing tour accidents out of Ketchikan, Alaska, one in July and one in August, both DeHavilland DHC-2 aircraft. Both directly involving VFR operations in IFR conditions of rain, fog, low clouds, and strong downdrafts. The July accident resulted in 5 fatalities and 4 serious injuries, and the August accident in 5 fatalities.
We will hope for better results in September. Thanks for listening.
RS
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Wednesday, September 5, 2007
CTAF and UNICOM
Hi readers: There has always been a certain amount of confusion regarding CTAF and UNICOM as to purpose, use, and where to find the information on both. Well, it has to do with in and out traffic and flight safety at and in the vicinity of airports operating without a control tower.
Why is this so important? It is essential that all pilots be aware of and communicate with other traffic when approaching, departing, and in the vicinity of an airport without a tower since all the aircraft may not have a communications ability. To achieve the highest degree of safety, all of the radio-equipped aircraft must transmit and receive on a common frequency for advisories. CTAF (Common Traffic Advisory Frequency) is the frequency that must be used for this purpose. The CTAF's for each airport are listed on aeronautical charts or in the FAA Airport Facility Directory or in other appropriate publications. The CTAF can be obtained by contacting any FSS (Flight Service Station), and you can communicate on a UNICOM frequency or a published CTAF.
What is UNICOM? UNICOM is a nongovernmental air/ground radio communications station which may provide airport information for public use airports where there is no tower or FSS. UNICOM stations provide pilots (on request) with weather information, wind direction, the recommended runway, and other necessary information. If the UNICOM frequency is designated as the CTAF, it will be be identified in the appropriate aeronautical publication.
If an airport has a tower and it is temporarily closed or operated on a part-time basis and there is no FSS on the airport or the FSS is closed, then the pilot must announce his position and intentions on the CTAF. Where there is no tower, FSS, or UNICOM station on the airport, a MULTICOM frequency of 122.9 is used for self-announce procedures. If there is no tower, but a FSS is open, you can communicate with the FSS on the CTAF. In retrospect, the CTAF may be a UNICOM, MULTICOM, FSS, or tower frequency, which all can be found in the aforementioned directory.
There are established, recommended traffic advisory practices in FAR, Chapter 4: Air Traffic Control, that pilots should note and use.
CTAF and UNICOM are very important, also, to all pilots in flight since an emergency can always occur and the need to communicate with an airport becomes very necessary.
Why is this so important? It is essential that all pilots be aware of and communicate with other traffic when approaching, departing, and in the vicinity of an airport without a tower since all the aircraft may not have a communications ability. To achieve the highest degree of safety, all of the radio-equipped aircraft must transmit and receive on a common frequency for advisories. CTAF (Common Traffic Advisory Frequency) is the frequency that must be used for this purpose. The CTAF's for each airport are listed on aeronautical charts or in the FAA Airport Facility Directory or in other appropriate publications. The CTAF can be obtained by contacting any FSS (Flight Service Station), and you can communicate on a UNICOM frequency or a published CTAF.
What is UNICOM? UNICOM is a nongovernmental air/ground radio communications station which may provide airport information for public use airports where there is no tower or FSS. UNICOM stations provide pilots (on request) with weather information, wind direction, the recommended runway, and other necessary information. If the UNICOM frequency is designated as the CTAF, it will be be identified in the appropriate aeronautical publication.
If an airport has a tower and it is temporarily closed or operated on a part-time basis and there is no FSS on the airport or the FSS is closed, then the pilot must announce his position and intentions on the CTAF. Where there is no tower, FSS, or UNICOM station on the airport, a MULTICOM frequency of 122.9 is used for self-announce procedures. If there is no tower, but a FSS is open, you can communicate with the FSS on the CTAF. In retrospect, the CTAF may be a UNICOM, MULTICOM, FSS, or tower frequency, which all can be found in the aforementioned directory.
There are established, recommended traffic advisory practices in FAR, Chapter 4: Air Traffic Control, that pilots should note and use.
CTAF and UNICOM are very important, also, to all pilots in flight since an emergency can always occur and the need to communicate with an airport becomes very necessary.
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Thursday, August 30, 2007
PIREPS
Hello Readers: Before we get to PIREPS, have you thought about your weight lately? Do you know what your Body Mass Index is? BMI will give you a good indication of where you stand on weight. This through the courtesy of Karen Miller-Kovach, RD, Chief Scientific Officer of Weight Watchers In'l, the formula: Divide your weight, multiplied by 703, by your height in inches squared. You should comeout somewhere between 20 and 30. 20 to 30 - optimal, 25 to 30 - overweight, and 30+ - Obese.
Now the PIREPS - What are they? Get out your Acronym reader.
Pilot reports are inflight, usually en route, weather reports to help other inflight pilots know what is up ahead of them. You can check PIREPS either prior to your takeoff or en route. Or if need be, you can contact the pilot directly to ask his assesment of the weather. Normally you would contact your FSS (Flight Service Station) and get EFAS (En route Flight Advisory Service).
EFAS (Flight Watch) is a service specifically designed to provide, upon pilot request, timely weather information pertinent to type of flight, intended route of flight, and altitude. This service is within the FSS system, and is listed in any Airport/Facility Directory.
FAA, through the air traffic facilities, is required to solicit PIREPS when the following conditions exist - reported or forecast:
1. Ceilings at or below 5,000 ft.
2. Visibility at or below 5 miles - surface or aloft.
3. Thunderstorms and related phenomena.
4. Icing conditions of a light or greater degree.
5. Turbulence of a moderate degree or greater.
6. Wind shear, reported or forecast, and volcanic ash clouds.
Pilots are urged to cooperate and volunteer reports of cloud bases, tops and layers; flight visibility; precipitation; visibilitity restrictions such as haze, smoke, or dust; wind at altitude; and temperature aloft.
PIREPS should be given to EFAS, AFSS/FSS, ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control), and terminal ATC. The EFAS (Flight Watch) facilities, as mentioned, has the specific duty of collecting and exchanging PIREPS with en route aircraft. If pilot are not able to make PIREPS by radio, then the reports should be given to the local FSS upon landing.
Some of the uses of PIREPS areas follows:
ATCT (Tower) uses the reports to expedite the flow of air traffic locally.
AFSS/FSS uses the reports to brief other pilots inflight and en route.
ARTC uses the reports to expedite the flow of en route traffic.
NWS (National Weather Service) uses PIREPS to verify or amend conditions contained in Aviation Forecasts and Advisories, and pilot weather briefings.
There are numerous pages of information in the FARs regarding PIREPS, their importance, and specifically how to prepare and use them. Pilots should take the time to digest this information in the FARs, with the idea of participating in PIREPS. Thanks for listening. R.S.
Now the PIREPS - What are they? Get out your Acronym reader.
Pilot reports are inflight, usually en route, weather reports to help other inflight pilots know what is up ahead of them. You can check PIREPS either prior to your takeoff or en route. Or if need be, you can contact the pilot directly to ask his assesment of the weather. Normally you would contact your FSS (Flight Service Station) and get EFAS (En route Flight Advisory Service).
EFAS (Flight Watch) is a service specifically designed to provide, upon pilot request, timely weather information pertinent to type of flight, intended route of flight, and altitude. This service is within the FSS system, and is listed in any Airport/Facility Directory.
FAA, through the air traffic facilities, is required to solicit PIREPS when the following conditions exist - reported or forecast:
1. Ceilings at or below 5,000 ft.
2. Visibility at or below 5 miles - surface or aloft.
3. Thunderstorms and related phenomena.
4. Icing conditions of a light or greater degree.
5. Turbulence of a moderate degree or greater.
6. Wind shear, reported or forecast, and volcanic ash clouds.
Pilots are urged to cooperate and volunteer reports of cloud bases, tops and layers; flight visibility; precipitation; visibilitity restrictions such as haze, smoke, or dust; wind at altitude; and temperature aloft.
PIREPS should be given to EFAS, AFSS/FSS, ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control), and terminal ATC. The EFAS (Flight Watch) facilities, as mentioned, has the specific duty of collecting and exchanging PIREPS with en route aircraft. If pilot are not able to make PIREPS by radio, then the reports should be given to the local FSS upon landing.
Some of the uses of PIREPS areas follows:
ATCT (Tower) uses the reports to expedite the flow of air traffic locally.
AFSS/FSS uses the reports to brief other pilots inflight and en route.
ARTC uses the reports to expedite the flow of en route traffic.
NWS (National Weather Service) uses PIREPS to verify or amend conditions contained in Aviation Forecasts and Advisories, and pilot weather briefings.
There are numerous pages of information in the FARs regarding PIREPS, their importance, and specifically how to prepare and use them. Pilots should take the time to digest this information in the FARs, with the idea of participating in PIREPS. Thanks for listening. R.S.
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Monday, August 27, 2007
Aviation News, Interest, and Careers
Today we have a 3-way message of people making news, promoting interest in aviation, and spreading the word of careers and jobs in the aviation field.
First of all we'll say goodbye to FAA Administrator Marion Blakely - she is to vacate the Administrator post 9-13-07. Enough said. Now, Mr. Bush, let's fill the position with loads of aviation experience and dedication towards solving the current problems in FAA, in all types of flying, and plan for a healthy expansion of aviation demands.
Secondly, I'd like to congratulate young Barrington Irving (23) who flew around the world - solo yet - in a donated Columbia 400 airplane, becoming the youngest person to accomplish such a feat (I learned this from AVWEB's Podcast of 8-24-07). I'm sure it took guts and determination. As reported, Irving is now focusing his efforts on Experience Aviation - an aviation group he founded in 2005 to get people interested in aviation. This is the spark aviation needs and I'm sure we'd like to hear more about him and his group.
I would also like to point out and give credit to AOPA (Aircraft Owner Pilot Association) and it's energetic President Phil Boyer - champion of the rights of GA pilots for the past 15 years - for the dedication to and continued aviation oversite. There are other associations (NBAA, ATA, etc.) that are monitoring our aviation interests, also.
Although AOPA doesn't need me to trumpet their programs (I've been a member for years), I'd like to point out their support of the young people and their desire for careers and jobs in the aviation field. AOPA cites 60+ careers and jobs needed in aviation - not just pilots, all a part of an industry of 1.3 million jobs and $158 billion in annual economic activity.
Some of the career openings cited are Airline and Other Career Pilots, Airline and Airport Operations, Aircraft Manufacturing and Maintenance, Scientific and Technical Services (engineers, architects, cartographers, meteorologists, etc.), Food Service, Law Enforcement, Avionics, and others. I will add Government Service careers such as Air Traffic Controllers in the FAA and Air Safety Investigators in the NTSB.
AOPA has a world of information for the asking - however, you need to become a member ($39/yr.). Your key to membership and a start is a strong interest in aviation and the willingness to learn and work. A good contact is the Pilot Information Center - 1-800-872-2672 or www.aopa.org on your computer. If I can help you get what you need, let me know. Thanks for listening. R.S.
First of all we'll say goodbye to FAA Administrator Marion Blakely - she is to vacate the Administrator post 9-13-07. Enough said. Now, Mr. Bush, let's fill the position with loads of aviation experience and dedication towards solving the current problems in FAA, in all types of flying, and plan for a healthy expansion of aviation demands.
Secondly, I'd like to congratulate young Barrington Irving (23) who flew around the world - solo yet - in a donated Columbia 400 airplane, becoming the youngest person to accomplish such a feat (I learned this from AVWEB's Podcast of 8-24-07). I'm sure it took guts and determination. As reported, Irving is now focusing his efforts on Experience Aviation - an aviation group he founded in 2005 to get people interested in aviation. This is the spark aviation needs and I'm sure we'd like to hear more about him and his group.
I would also like to point out and give credit to AOPA (Aircraft Owner Pilot Association) and it's energetic President Phil Boyer - champion of the rights of GA pilots for the past 15 years - for the dedication to and continued aviation oversite. There are other associations (NBAA, ATA, etc.) that are monitoring our aviation interests, also.
Although AOPA doesn't need me to trumpet their programs (I've been a member for years), I'd like to point out their support of the young people and their desire for careers and jobs in the aviation field. AOPA cites 60+ careers and jobs needed in aviation - not just pilots, all a part of an industry of 1.3 million jobs and $158 billion in annual economic activity.
Some of the career openings cited are Airline and Other Career Pilots, Airline and Airport Operations, Aircraft Manufacturing and Maintenance, Scientific and Technical Services (engineers, architects, cartographers, meteorologists, etc.), Food Service, Law Enforcement, Avionics, and others. I will add Government Service careers such as Air Traffic Controllers in the FAA and Air Safety Investigators in the NTSB.
AOPA has a world of information for the asking - however, you need to become a member ($39/yr.). Your key to membership and a start is a strong interest in aviation and the willingness to learn and work. A good contact is the Pilot Information Center - 1-800-872-2672 or www.aopa.org on your computer. If I can help you get what you need, let me know. Thanks for listening. R.S.
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Friday, August 24, 2007
Near - Miss Incident of Jets at LAX
Now that everybody has heard about the near-miss incident of Westjet B-737 and Northwest Airlines Airbus A320 in daylight at Los Angeles airport on 8-16-07, let's take a quick look and see what did happen and why. NTSB is investigating and the factual report will be forthcoming as usual.
A runway incursion or a near-miss? Some, including NTSB are calling it a runway incursion. However, so far the facts reported show that an incursion did not occur. It was definitely an incident, one that could have been disastrous for all. As a pilot I shudder to think what could have happened, and I'm sure the pilots involved have already relived the incident several times since. The passengers - how lucky they were that a collision did not occur. From the nose of the Westjet B-737 to the wingtip of the Northwest Airbus there was all of 37 ft.
So let's sort out the facts (or the reported facts) at this point. The Airbus was cleared for takeoff on Runway 24 L. The Westjet B-737 had just landed on Runway 24R and was positioned on Taxiway Y, wanting to cross Runway 24 L. Reportedly, he was cleared by Ground Control to cross Runway 24L. The Airbus has started takeoff and reached about 155 knots, probably ready to rotate. The B-737 managed to remain clear - we don't know exactly where on Taxiway Y - reportedly crossing the hold short line but not entering Runway 24, either moving or stopped.
The Westjet B-737 had arived from Calgary, Canada carrying 136 passengers and the Northwest Airlines Airbus was taking off with 150 passengers. At this point it appears that the PIC of the Airbus was properly cleared for takeoff by the Tower Controller. ( I do wonder if the PIC observed the the Westjet movements, which would have been ahead of him.)
The PIC of the Westjet would have to been cleared by the Tower Controller to cross Runway 24L - he or the Ist Officer switched to Ground Control without authorization from the Tower Controller during exit on Taxiway Y. The Ground Controller apparently assumed that the Tower Controller had instructed the Westjet to cross Runway24L.
It appears that almost all of the blame lies with the Westjet Captain and the Ground and Tower Controllers. In takeoff and landing operations there is no room for assumptions. The coordination betwen Controllers in the Tower appears lacking and the misunderstanding between the Ground Controller and the Westjet, particularly on the part of the Ground Controller, was primary to the incident. I wonder too, if the ground airport radar in the Tower was functioning for a reference.
In most respects, the misunderstandings shown in the incident remain inexcusable - but they do happen. In fact, they are happening quite frequently over the continental U.S. We'll see what the NTSB Investigators have to say. Thanks for listening. R.S.
A runway incursion or a near-miss? Some, including NTSB are calling it a runway incursion. However, so far the facts reported show that an incursion did not occur. It was definitely an incident, one that could have been disastrous for all. As a pilot I shudder to think what could have happened, and I'm sure the pilots involved have already relived the incident several times since. The passengers - how lucky they were that a collision did not occur. From the nose of the Westjet B-737 to the wingtip of the Northwest Airbus there was all of 37 ft.
So let's sort out the facts (or the reported facts) at this point. The Airbus was cleared for takeoff on Runway 24 L. The Westjet B-737 had just landed on Runway 24R and was positioned on Taxiway Y, wanting to cross Runway 24 L. Reportedly, he was cleared by Ground Control to cross Runway 24L. The Airbus has started takeoff and reached about 155 knots, probably ready to rotate. The B-737 managed to remain clear - we don't know exactly where on Taxiway Y - reportedly crossing the hold short line but not entering Runway 24, either moving or stopped.
The Westjet B-737 had arived from Calgary, Canada carrying 136 passengers and the Northwest Airlines Airbus was taking off with 150 passengers. At this point it appears that the PIC of the Airbus was properly cleared for takeoff by the Tower Controller. ( I do wonder if the PIC observed the the Westjet movements, which would have been ahead of him.)
The PIC of the Westjet would have to been cleared by the Tower Controller to cross Runway 24L - he or the Ist Officer switched to Ground Control without authorization from the Tower Controller during exit on Taxiway Y. The Ground Controller apparently assumed that the Tower Controller had instructed the Westjet to cross Runway24L.
It appears that almost all of the blame lies with the Westjet Captain and the Ground and Tower Controllers. In takeoff and landing operations there is no room for assumptions. The coordination betwen Controllers in the Tower appears lacking and the misunderstanding between the Ground Controller and the Westjet, particularly on the part of the Ground Controller, was primary to the incident. I wonder too, if the ground airport radar in the Tower was functioning for a reference.
In most respects, the misunderstandings shown in the incident remain inexcusable - but they do happen. In fact, they are happening quite frequently over the continental U.S. We'll see what the NTSB Investigators have to say. Thanks for listening. R.S.
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Monday, August 20, 2007
The Lost Is Found
Recently, while browsing through the small library where I live, I uncovered a story that I had been seeking for a long time. To wit: How was young Joe Kennedy (eldest son of Joseph and Rose Kennedy, and brother of Jack and Bobby and Ted Kennedy) lost during WWII?
Doris Kearn Goodwin's story - The Fitzgeralds And The Kennedys - an American Saga - published in Readers Digest Todays Best Nonfiction in 1987 told me what I wanted to know.
Joe was commissioned in the Army Air Forces as a B-24 pilot and had already accomplished 39 missions in the European theater and was due to come home in two weeks. But D-Day (Normandy) was coming up and Joe volunteered to stay another month to fly patrols in the PB4Y over the English Channel (Operation Cork). The operation was a success - not a single ship of the invasion fleet was lost to German U-boats.
After D-Day the Germans began propelling V-1 rockets into London from giant concrete bunkers on the French coast. Civilian casualties were high.
A plan was then conceived - PB4Y's would be gutted and loaded with explosives and flown to be targeted to the bunkers. Joe kennedy and copilot Wilford Willy volunteered for the dangerous mission - to fly the airplane across the channel toward the target, Calais, a giant concrete bunker, believed to be the launching site of the V-1 rockets.
The flight was scheduled for August 12 (D-day was June 4, 1944). At 5:52 Joe and Wilford lifted off from the channel in the PB4Y loaded with high explosives. At 6:10 pm, at an altitude of 2,000 ft, Joe engaged the autopilot and called the mother ship to take over. They were to then bailout. At 6:20 pm a huge explosion occurred. Joe and Wilford never made it, and were never found. Real heroes, by any count.
I thank Ms Goodwin and Readers Digest Books for my taking liberty with this account.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Doris Kearn Goodwin's story - The Fitzgeralds And The Kennedys - an American Saga - published in Readers Digest Todays Best Nonfiction in 1987 told me what I wanted to know.
Joe was commissioned in the Army Air Forces as a B-24 pilot and had already accomplished 39 missions in the European theater and was due to come home in two weeks. But D-Day (Normandy) was coming up and Joe volunteered to stay another month to fly patrols in the PB4Y over the English Channel (Operation Cork). The operation was a success - not a single ship of the invasion fleet was lost to German U-boats.
After D-Day the Germans began propelling V-1 rockets into London from giant concrete bunkers on the French coast. Civilian casualties were high.
A plan was then conceived - PB4Y's would be gutted and loaded with explosives and flown to be targeted to the bunkers. Joe kennedy and copilot Wilford Willy volunteered for the dangerous mission - to fly the airplane across the channel toward the target, Calais, a giant concrete bunker, believed to be the launching site of the V-1 rockets.
The flight was scheduled for August 12 (D-day was June 4, 1944). At 5:52 Joe and Wilford lifted off from the channel in the PB4Y loaded with high explosives. At 6:10 pm, at an altitude of 2,000 ft, Joe engaged the autopilot and called the mother ship to take over. They were to then bailout. At 6:20 pm a huge explosion occurred. Joe and Wilford never made it, and were never found. Real heroes, by any count.
I thank Ms Goodwin and Readers Digest Books for my taking liberty with this account.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
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