Hi Readers: In my aviation experience I've found that certain definitions (FAA regulations, for instance) - acronyms and phrases - indicate a definite meaning, but relate to several separate operations. Here is a beginning list, covering a few basics, and items relating pretty much to complete flight. There are other definitions that will be covered, periodically, in future blogs. In fact, most of them are covered in the Pilot/Controller Glossary of the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM).
Basics:
Ceiling - Height of the lowest layer of clouds or obscuration phenomena that is reported as
broken, overcast, or as obscuration.
Visibility - In units of distance to see and identify prominent unlighted object by day and
lighted objects at night, in statute miles.
Track - The actual flight path of the aircraft over the surface of the earth.
Tailwind - Any wind greater than 90 degrees to the longitudinal axis (magnetic) of the
runway.
Crosswind Component - The wind component measured in knots at 90 degrees to the
longitudinal axis of the runway.
True Airspeed - Calibrated airspeed corrected for altitude and temperature. True airspeed
increases with altitude.
Cardinal Altitudes - Odd or even thousand-foot altitudes or flight levels.
Weather:
Significant Weather - SIGMETS - severe and extreme turbulence, severe icing, widespread
dust or sandstorm that will reduce visibility to less than 3 miles.
Marginal Weather - Less than VFR conditions.
Hazardous Weather - Summary of SIGMETS and PIREPS such as thunderstorms, low
ceilings and visibilities not included in Hazardous Advisories.
Climb and VFR Flight:
Cleared As Filed - Aircraft is cleared to proceed IAW the route of flight filed in a flight
plan - does not include the altitude, DP, or DP transition.
Climbout - That portion of flight between takeoff and the initial cruising altitude.
Climb To VFR - ATC authorization for an aircraft to climb to VFR conditions, within certain
class surface areas when the only weather limitation is restricted visibility
- must remain clear of clouds.
VFR Not Recommended - An advisory by a FSS to a pilot during preflight or an inflight
weather briefing - when current and forecast conditions are at
or below VFR minimums.
Visual Meteorological Conditions - Weather conditions in terms of visibility, distance from
clouds, and ceiling equal to or better than minimums.
Special VFR Conditions - Conditions that are less than for basic VFR - permitted flight
under VFR class surface areas.
Approach and Landing:
Visual Approach - On an IFR flight plan, which authorizes the pilot to proceed visually -
ceiling 1,000' and visibility 3 miles.
Contact Approach - By visual reference, on an IFR flight plan, only by request from the
pilot, and when the ground visibility is at least 1 mile.
Straight-In Approach - Can be either VFR or IFR - visually and clear of clouds.
Runway Threshold - Relates to runway markings for visual, precision, and nonprecision
approaches, including a displaced threshold.
Touchdown Zone - The first 3,000' of runway beginning at the threshold.
Terminal Area - A general term used to describe airspace in which Approach Control
provides service to airport traffic.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Showing posts with label hazardous weather. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hazardous weather. Show all posts
Friday, January 25, 2008
Thursday, January 3, 2008
Aviation Weather Services
Hi Readers: Aviation Weather Services promolgated by the FAA, the NWS, and NASA are best described by and necessarily involve the actual flight, local or x-c, VFR and IFR flight plans; beginning with flight planning, and leading to en route flight, and terminating with descent and approach to land. In addition, the Weather Services provide an assist to the Controllers in preparing for the duties in which they are charged. Even local flights must be considered in terms of current weather - often pilots on local flights are caught in a sudden change of weather from VFR to IFR, as many of the aircraft accidents reveal.
Weather is a 24-hour phenomenom, in constant change of its elements and phases. In 20 minutes a cloud ceiling may ascend or descend 2,000 feet, precipitation can change from rain to ice, and visibilities can become obscured or obliterated.
Since most weather services are tied to a specific phase of flight, let's plan a VFR x-c flight. Without getting into the details, we would either file a flightplan with AFSS/FSS by telephone using TIBS (Telephone Information Briefing Service), a recording of the destination current weather, or talking with a weather specialist concerning the destination current and forecasted weather (1-800-WxBrief- toll free). This is a Preflight Briefing to help the pilot determine a "go" or "no go" decision. Or, if you are computer-oriented, you may file a flight plan with DUATS(Direct User Access Terminal System) - toll free, and get alpha-numeric preflight weather data and file a domestic VFR or IFR flight plan.
We might use, in conjunction with our flight plan or separately, METAR (Aviation routine weather report) or an FA(an area forecast), if advantageous.
After takeoff, we are considered in an en route phase of flight and can utilize several services to our advantage.
Lest we forget, we can still communicate with AFSS/FSS on a common frquency of 122.2 or a discrete frequency for an individual station to file, activate, close, or change a flight plan; request an IFR clearance, contact ATCT/ARTCC for control; file position reports, pass PIREPS (Pilot weather reports); request status of Special Use Airspace; and request assistance in an inflight emergency.
Normally, we might use EFAS (En Route Flight Advisory Service) for nonroutine weather needs in flight or TWEB ( Transcribed Weather Broadcasts) for the routine weather needs in flight. Inflight advisories include SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Information), Convective SIGMETs, AIRMETs (Airmen Meteorological Information), FAs (Area Forecasts) , Winds Aloft Forecasts (176 locations in 48 States), and PIREPs (Reports by pilots of weather conditions in flight).
Descending from en route flight to approach and landing at our destination we might use any number of weather advisories, primarily that concerning the weather at the destination airport or terminal such as FA, LLWAS (Low level wind shear alert system), PIREPs, TAF(Terminal Area Forecast), and WW (Severe Weather Watch). And, of course, our continued communications, depending on VFR or IFR, with ARTCC, TRACON ( Terminal Radar Approach Control), ATCT, and following with GT (Ground Control) to the very end of our flight.
ATCT and TRACON both use air/ground communications, visual signals, and other devices to provide ATC services to aircraft operating in the vicinity of an airport. ATC services authorizes aircraft to land or takeoff at the airport controlled by the tower or to transit the Class D airspace area regardless of flight plan or weather conditions. A tower may also provide approach control services.
To put the aviation weather services in perspective, the pilot must deal with ARTCC, ATCT, and TRACON (as spelled out in AC 00-45F) with respect to their flight plan to effect location and positive control of the aircraft. TRACONs manage the airspace 10 to 400 miles outside of selected airports and below 13,000 feet. They also coordinate spacing as aircraft approach and depart airports. Terminal Controllers are knowlegeable of current weather conditions and are prepared to advise pilots of hazardous weather conditions within a 150 nm sector or area. Tower operators are certified to act as official weather observers.
The December 2007 aircraft Accident Accounting is in process.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Weather is a 24-hour phenomenom, in constant change of its elements and phases. In 20 minutes a cloud ceiling may ascend or descend 2,000 feet, precipitation can change from rain to ice, and visibilities can become obscured or obliterated.
Since most weather services are tied to a specific phase of flight, let's plan a VFR x-c flight. Without getting into the details, we would either file a flightplan with AFSS/FSS by telephone using TIBS (Telephone Information Briefing Service), a recording of the destination current weather, or talking with a weather specialist concerning the destination current and forecasted weather (1-800-WxBrief- toll free). This is a Preflight Briefing to help the pilot determine a "go" or "no go" decision. Or, if you are computer-oriented, you may file a flight plan with DUATS(Direct User Access Terminal System) - toll free, and get alpha-numeric preflight weather data and file a domestic VFR or IFR flight plan.
We might use, in conjunction with our flight plan or separately, METAR (Aviation routine weather report) or an FA(an area forecast), if advantageous.
After takeoff, we are considered in an en route phase of flight and can utilize several services to our advantage.
Lest we forget, we can still communicate with AFSS/FSS on a common frquency of 122.2 or a discrete frequency for an individual station to file, activate, close, or change a flight plan; request an IFR clearance, contact ATCT/ARTCC for control; file position reports, pass PIREPS (Pilot weather reports); request status of Special Use Airspace; and request assistance in an inflight emergency.
Normally, we might use EFAS (En Route Flight Advisory Service) for nonroutine weather needs in flight or TWEB ( Transcribed Weather Broadcasts) for the routine weather needs in flight. Inflight advisories include SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Information), Convective SIGMETs, AIRMETs (Airmen Meteorological Information), FAs (Area Forecasts) , Winds Aloft Forecasts (176 locations in 48 States), and PIREPs (Reports by pilots of weather conditions in flight).
Descending from en route flight to approach and landing at our destination we might use any number of weather advisories, primarily that concerning the weather at the destination airport or terminal such as FA, LLWAS (Low level wind shear alert system), PIREPs, TAF(Terminal Area Forecast), and WW (Severe Weather Watch). And, of course, our continued communications, depending on VFR or IFR, with ARTCC, TRACON ( Terminal Radar Approach Control), ATCT, and following with GT (Ground Control) to the very end of our flight.
ATCT and TRACON both use air/ground communications, visual signals, and other devices to provide ATC services to aircraft operating in the vicinity of an airport. ATC services authorizes aircraft to land or takeoff at the airport controlled by the tower or to transit the Class D airspace area regardless of flight plan or weather conditions. A tower may also provide approach control services.
To put the aviation weather services in perspective, the pilot must deal with ARTCC, ATCT, and TRACON (as spelled out in AC 00-45F) with respect to their flight plan to effect location and positive control of the aircraft. TRACONs manage the airspace 10 to 400 miles outside of selected airports and below 13,000 feet. They also coordinate spacing as aircraft approach and depart airports. Terminal Controllers are knowlegeable of current weather conditions and are prepared to advise pilots of hazardous weather conditions within a 150 nm sector or area. Tower operators are certified to act as official weather observers.
The December 2007 aircraft Accident Accounting is in process.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Aircraft Icing
Hi Readers: Now that we are in the winter weather of the year, we must all face the fact that, for flying, icing conditions on the ground or in the air is upon us (although icing conditions can occur in flight at any time of the year depending on the weather systems). Icing conditions on the ground before flight without de-icing is dangerous (and foolhardy) and icing conditions at altitude without de-icing and anti-icing are dangerous and lethal. In flight, icing can cause rapid loss of altitude and/or loss of control in minutes. If your airplane is not equipped with de-icing and anti-icing gear, or not certified for flight in icing conditions, its your knowledge and good judgment of the weather against nature.
Although I won't dwell on the many aircraft accidents over the years caused by icing, some of the worst fatal accidents have been caused by icing - principally due to our lack of knowledge, our judgment, and lack of anti-icing equipment. General Aviation (GA) and Commuter type (Part 23) airplanes are the most vulnerable since they are flown at the lower altitudes where icing conditions occur, and most of the airplanes are not equipped with ice-prevention gear or the intention of flight was not to encounter weather conditions.
How, then, does inflight icing occur? Well, we have to be flying in, around, or through stratus and cumulonimbus clouds containing water droplets at or nearing freezing temperatures, and nature takes care of the rest. There can be induction icing - ice forming around the engine air intake (particularly bad for jet engines since ice will form in chunks which may be ingested) or structural icing, either as clear or rime ice, formed when supercooled water droplets impact the wing and control surfaces (top and bottom) freezing in a solid sheet of ice or in a irregular shape - usually between zero degrees and minus 10 degrees centigrade. Such icing has been encountered in a cumulonimbus cloud at temperatures down to minus 25 degrees centigrade. Mixed icing, clear and rime ice, which result in an irregular shape on airfoils, can occur while flying through snow, ice pellets, or small hail.
The effects of ice on the airplane are cumulative - thrust is reduced, drag increases, lift lessens, and weight increases. The combined results are an increase in stall speed and a deterioration of airplane performance. In extreme cases, 2" to 3" of ice can form on the leading edge of an airfoil in less than 5 minutes.
A recent Cessna 208 Caravan accident near Mt. Ranier, Washington, reminds us that icing problems are still with us, in spite of de-icing and anti-icing equipment, along with GPS and digital instruments. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are still investigating.
In Airline and Part 121 flying (all IFR flight plans), cancellations and delays due to icing conditions can cost millions of dollars in one day. The cost of de-icing fluid, at a cost of 3 to 4 dollars/gallon adds to their problems. Part 121 operations covers the transport aircraft icing conditions. Part 135 and 91 flying is covered under 135.227 and 91.527.
NASA, FAA, and NTSB have been conducting research on aircraft icing problems over the years (see applicable icing FAA Advisory Circulars) and as of 6-1-07 the FAA was still working on a proposed rulemaking (Docket #FAA-2007-27654), titled Activation of Ice Protection, applying, principally, to Part 25 Transport Category airplanes. (It is hoped that FAA will follow with Part 23 aircraft). Under the proposal, Aircraft Manufacturers would be required to add an ice-detection and activation system to the present de-ice and anti-ice systems, and mandate that the protection system operate automatically and continuously. I think there is going to be a lot of discussion on this proposal.
How to avoid flying in icing conditions? For GA and Commuter aircraft, use all available weather services and reports to pinpoint icing areas and then plan on avoiding them. If you encounter icing conditions at altitude, use your available de-icing and anti-icing equipment immediately, change altitude up or down, and/or make a change in course (not necessarily 180 degrees since the true direction of the weather system is not known). Leave the autopilot off. Replan your flight or land at the nearest available airport (that will accommodate your airplane) and wait it out.
Proper preflight action includes, on filing an IFR flight plan, determining the freezing level and the levels above and below for weather precipitation areas. If your flight route penetrates the freezing level, request a new altitude or route. Make use of appropriate SIGMETS, AIRMETS, and PIREPS, and any other source of inflight weather advisory in planning and executing en route flight. In general, make a habit of checking FAA Advisory Circulars - FAAs method of advising new developments or action on pertinent problems.
Thanks for listening and Happy Thanksgiving! R.S.
Although I won't dwell on the many aircraft accidents over the years caused by icing, some of the worst fatal accidents have been caused by icing - principally due to our lack of knowledge, our judgment, and lack of anti-icing equipment. General Aviation (GA) and Commuter type (Part 23) airplanes are the most vulnerable since they are flown at the lower altitudes where icing conditions occur, and most of the airplanes are not equipped with ice-prevention gear or the intention of flight was not to encounter weather conditions.
How, then, does inflight icing occur? Well, we have to be flying in, around, or through stratus and cumulonimbus clouds containing water droplets at or nearing freezing temperatures, and nature takes care of the rest. There can be induction icing - ice forming around the engine air intake (particularly bad for jet engines since ice will form in chunks which may be ingested) or structural icing, either as clear or rime ice, formed when supercooled water droplets impact the wing and control surfaces (top and bottom) freezing in a solid sheet of ice or in a irregular shape - usually between zero degrees and minus 10 degrees centigrade. Such icing has been encountered in a cumulonimbus cloud at temperatures down to minus 25 degrees centigrade. Mixed icing, clear and rime ice, which result in an irregular shape on airfoils, can occur while flying through snow, ice pellets, or small hail.
The effects of ice on the airplane are cumulative - thrust is reduced, drag increases, lift lessens, and weight increases. The combined results are an increase in stall speed and a deterioration of airplane performance. In extreme cases, 2" to 3" of ice can form on the leading edge of an airfoil in less than 5 minutes.
A recent Cessna 208 Caravan accident near Mt. Ranier, Washington, reminds us that icing problems are still with us, in spite of de-icing and anti-icing equipment, along with GPS and digital instruments. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are still investigating.
In Airline and Part 121 flying (all IFR flight plans), cancellations and delays due to icing conditions can cost millions of dollars in one day. The cost of de-icing fluid, at a cost of 3 to 4 dollars/gallon adds to their problems. Part 121 operations covers the transport aircraft icing conditions. Part 135 and 91 flying is covered under 135.227 and 91.527.
NASA, FAA, and NTSB have been conducting research on aircraft icing problems over the years (see applicable icing FAA Advisory Circulars) and as of 6-1-07 the FAA was still working on a proposed rulemaking (Docket #FAA-2007-27654), titled Activation of Ice Protection, applying, principally, to Part 25 Transport Category airplanes. (It is hoped that FAA will follow with Part 23 aircraft). Under the proposal, Aircraft Manufacturers would be required to add an ice-detection and activation system to the present de-ice and anti-ice systems, and mandate that the protection system operate automatically and continuously. I think there is going to be a lot of discussion on this proposal.
How to avoid flying in icing conditions? For GA and Commuter aircraft, use all available weather services and reports to pinpoint icing areas and then plan on avoiding them. If you encounter icing conditions at altitude, use your available de-icing and anti-icing equipment immediately, change altitude up or down, and/or make a change in course (not necessarily 180 degrees since the true direction of the weather system is not known). Leave the autopilot off. Replan your flight or land at the nearest available airport (that will accommodate your airplane) and wait it out.
Proper preflight action includes, on filing an IFR flight plan, determining the freezing level and the levels above and below for weather precipitation areas. If your flight route penetrates the freezing level, request a new altitude or route. Make use of appropriate SIGMETS, AIRMETS, and PIREPS, and any other source of inflight weather advisory in planning and executing en route flight. In general, make a habit of checking FAA Advisory Circulars - FAAs method of advising new developments or action on pertinent problems.
Thanks for listening and Happy Thanksgiving! R.S.
Thursday, November 15, 2007
October 2007 aircraft Accident/Incidents
Hi Readers: It time to review the October Accidents/Incidents as reported by NTSB ( There were none reported for Oct 1, 30th, and 31st).
Therewere 74 accidents (4 incidents)( 3 non-U.S. accidents) of which 23 were fatal accidents accounting for 48 fatalities. One fatal accident occurred in Venezuela, accounting for 2 fatalities; one fatal accident occurred in Switzerland, accounting for 2 fatalities; and one Beech D55 accident (1 fatality) occurred near St.Croix, Virgin Islands - apparenty encountering IFR weather. Twenty fatal accidents occurred in the Continental U.S. accounting for 43 fatalities.
There were 4 Incidents during October - one, an Airbus 320 landing at Fargo, North Dakota with the nosegear turned 90 degrees, incurring minor damage; another, an Airbus received minor damage after landing when it struck a runway light at Chicago O'Hare Intl airport. In another incident, classified as a pilot deviation, a Cessna 525 made takeoff from Taxiway M, rather than Runway 36L, at Memphis Intl airport against Controller instructions. In the 4th incident a Bell Helicopter made a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico.
There were 4 balloon landing accidents at Albuquerque, New Mexico - all during the International Balloon Fiesta, and all striking objects on landing (due to wind and gusts) resulting in one fatality, 7 serious injury, and one minor injury.
There was one amateur-built gyroplane accident (one fatal, one serious injury) due to engine failure and resulting in impact with trees. One glider crashed during day VFR maneuvering (one fatal). A formation flight of Yakovlev Yak50 aircraft landing atGillespie Field, El Cajon, CA. resulted in a collision of 2 aircraft on the landing runway; and a Piper PA-32R collided with a Cessna 152 in the traffic pattern at Farmingdale, New York - there were no injuries.
The remaining fatal accidents were a conglomeration of day and night flights - an interesting study of accident causes and safety aspects: To begin, there was a 10-fatal Cessna 208B Caravan propjet on a 402 mile VFR night flight (returning 9 skydivers from a skydiving event near Boise, Idaho to a home base in Shelton, Wa.) that crashed about 45 miles WSW of Yakima, WA. at about 4,300 ft. msl, just south of Mt. Ranier, in IFR weather. There were indications of a rapid descent (6,800 ft/min) from 8,900 ft. and a power-on impact with mountainous terrain at 4,300 ft. msl. Low clouds, misty rain, and low visibility were reported in the area of the accident site, and a hunter in the area observed the aircraft first on horizontal flight, followed by vertical flight. Icing and loss of control were indicated.
The FAA reported that no service was provided to the pilot, there was no flight plan, and there was no record of a preflight or other weather briefing. The report noted VFR weather conditions generally along the route of flight, but IFR conditions in the Cascade mountains and western foothills. There was an AIRMET for icing, low-level turbulence, and mountain obscuration. (I can't imagine a Commercial pilot based at Shelton, Wa. not being clued-in on the weather, in that area, particularly in October). This particular airplane was equipped with analog gauges and digital avionics, including autopilot, GPS, transponder, and de-icing boots. The Mode C transponder was operating and FAA radar was tracking the airplane and observed the target, first at 14,400 ft, then at 13,000 ft, and then 8,900 ft, all in a matter of seconds. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are investigating the accident. In armchair analysis (based on what has been reported), I would have to say, in spite of the analog and digital instrumentation of the airplane, that this pilot demonstrated how not to conduct a VFR night x-c flight.
A second accident (5 fatal) involved a Beech A36 forced landing on takeoff and impact with power lines during variable direction and velocity of high winds and gusts. The aircraft was unable to gain altitude and maintain climb speed. Witnesses reported a rough engine. The pilot was IFR qualified and an IFR flight plan had been filed. Visual flight conditions existed. I wonder if this airplane was overloaded.
The remaining fatal accidents (11) involved an Aero Commander 560F (4 fatal) that impacted terrain after takeoff with a possible engine failure; a Rathyeon C90A (3 fatal) on a night VFR Medical flight which crashed during en route descent; a Cessna 310N (2 fatal) at 13,000 ft in icing conditions with an engine problem; a Cessna 150L (2 fatal), an Instructor and student, impacted terrain during takeoff climb - loss of power and loss of control indicated; a Piper PA-28 (2 fatal) on a night VFR x-c flight encountered IFR conditions and impacted trees and the ground; a Piper PA-28 impacted terrain on a night flight to Las Vegas - encountering IFR conditions; a Piper PA-18 collided with powerlines on a day VFR flight; A Bellanca 7GCBC aircraft crashed on a day VFR x-c flight - an outer wing failure indicated; and another Bellanca 7GCAA crashed due to loss of control following a tailwheel shimmy during a glider-tow operation; an Amateur-built Lambert Variez aircraft crashed during the pilot's test of an installed speed brake; and a Piper PA-18 collided with power lines on a VFR flight.
The October accidents indicate loss of control associated with aircraft and weather factors, along with doubtful flight planning and en route weather knowledge and awareness. Icing conditions, which can appear at any time of the year, seem to be a particular problem to pilots. Knowing the freezing level in weather and how to avoid the icing conditions is of the utmost importance. Pilots should learn how to use all the available weather, and weather-forecasting services, prior to and during en route flight. And, in spite of advanced instrumentation and the services available, pilots will always have to make the decision to fly or stay, or to choose an alternate, or land at the first available airport - and it may not be easy.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Therewere 74 accidents (4 incidents)( 3 non-U.S. accidents) of which 23 were fatal accidents accounting for 48 fatalities. One fatal accident occurred in Venezuela, accounting for 2 fatalities; one fatal accident occurred in Switzerland, accounting for 2 fatalities; and one Beech D55 accident (1 fatality) occurred near St.Croix, Virgin Islands - apparenty encountering IFR weather. Twenty fatal accidents occurred in the Continental U.S. accounting for 43 fatalities.
There were 4 Incidents during October - one, an Airbus 320 landing at Fargo, North Dakota with the nosegear turned 90 degrees, incurring minor damage; another, an Airbus received minor damage after landing when it struck a runway light at Chicago O'Hare Intl airport. In another incident, classified as a pilot deviation, a Cessna 525 made takeoff from Taxiway M, rather than Runway 36L, at Memphis Intl airport against Controller instructions. In the 4th incident a Bell Helicopter made a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico.
There were 4 balloon landing accidents at Albuquerque, New Mexico - all during the International Balloon Fiesta, and all striking objects on landing (due to wind and gusts) resulting in one fatality, 7 serious injury, and one minor injury.
There was one amateur-built gyroplane accident (one fatal, one serious injury) due to engine failure and resulting in impact with trees. One glider crashed during day VFR maneuvering (one fatal). A formation flight of Yakovlev Yak50 aircraft landing atGillespie Field, El Cajon, CA. resulted in a collision of 2 aircraft on the landing runway; and a Piper PA-32R collided with a Cessna 152 in the traffic pattern at Farmingdale, New York - there were no injuries.
The remaining fatal accidents were a conglomeration of day and night flights - an interesting study of accident causes and safety aspects: To begin, there was a 10-fatal Cessna 208B Caravan propjet on a 402 mile VFR night flight (returning 9 skydivers from a skydiving event near Boise, Idaho to a home base in Shelton, Wa.) that crashed about 45 miles WSW of Yakima, WA. at about 4,300 ft. msl, just south of Mt. Ranier, in IFR weather. There were indications of a rapid descent (6,800 ft/min) from 8,900 ft. and a power-on impact with mountainous terrain at 4,300 ft. msl. Low clouds, misty rain, and low visibility were reported in the area of the accident site, and a hunter in the area observed the aircraft first on horizontal flight, followed by vertical flight. Icing and loss of control were indicated.
The FAA reported that no service was provided to the pilot, there was no flight plan, and there was no record of a preflight or other weather briefing. The report noted VFR weather conditions generally along the route of flight, but IFR conditions in the Cascade mountains and western foothills. There was an AIRMET for icing, low-level turbulence, and mountain obscuration. (I can't imagine a Commercial pilot based at Shelton, Wa. not being clued-in on the weather, in that area, particularly in October). This particular airplane was equipped with analog gauges and digital avionics, including autopilot, GPS, transponder, and de-icing boots. The Mode C transponder was operating and FAA radar was tracking the airplane and observed the target, first at 14,400 ft, then at 13,000 ft, and then 8,900 ft, all in a matter of seconds. The NTSB and Cessna Aircraft are investigating the accident. In armchair analysis (based on what has been reported), I would have to say, in spite of the analog and digital instrumentation of the airplane, that this pilot demonstrated how not to conduct a VFR night x-c flight.
A second accident (5 fatal) involved a Beech A36 forced landing on takeoff and impact with power lines during variable direction and velocity of high winds and gusts. The aircraft was unable to gain altitude and maintain climb speed. Witnesses reported a rough engine. The pilot was IFR qualified and an IFR flight plan had been filed. Visual flight conditions existed. I wonder if this airplane was overloaded.
The remaining fatal accidents (11) involved an Aero Commander 560F (4 fatal) that impacted terrain after takeoff with a possible engine failure; a Rathyeon C90A (3 fatal) on a night VFR Medical flight which crashed during en route descent; a Cessna 310N (2 fatal) at 13,000 ft in icing conditions with an engine problem; a Cessna 150L (2 fatal), an Instructor and student, impacted terrain during takeoff climb - loss of power and loss of control indicated; a Piper PA-28 (2 fatal) on a night VFR x-c flight encountered IFR conditions and impacted trees and the ground; a Piper PA-28 impacted terrain on a night flight to Las Vegas - encountering IFR conditions; a Piper PA-18 collided with powerlines on a day VFR flight; A Bellanca 7GCBC aircraft crashed on a day VFR x-c flight - an outer wing failure indicated; and another Bellanca 7GCAA crashed due to loss of control following a tailwheel shimmy during a glider-tow operation; an Amateur-built Lambert Variez aircraft crashed during the pilot's test of an installed speed brake; and a Piper PA-18 collided with power lines on a VFR flight.
The October accidents indicate loss of control associated with aircraft and weather factors, along with doubtful flight planning and en route weather knowledge and awareness. Icing conditions, which can appear at any time of the year, seem to be a particular problem to pilots. Knowing the freezing level in weather and how to avoid the icing conditions is of the utmost importance. Pilots should learn how to use all the available weather, and weather-forecasting services, prior to and during en route flight. And, in spite of advanced instrumentation and the services available, pilots will always have to make the decision to fly or stay, or to choose an alternate, or land at the first available airport - and it may not be easy.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Sunday, October 14, 2007
September 2007 Aircraft Accidents/Incidents
Hi Readers: Its time to review the September Accident/Incidents as reported by NTSB. There were 98 accidents and 2 incidents (7 non-U.S. accidents) of which 36 were fatal accidents accounting for 134 fatalities.
One incident was a Part 121 Air Carrier DC-9 engine fire warning in flight, and the other was a night VFR incident in which the Tower Controller instructed a Part 135 Lear Jet pilot to taxi into position and hold on R19R at Potomac airport in Washington D.C. Runway 19R was actually closed and the runway lights were off. The runway closure was advertised on ATIS and the closure was placed on the ground radar display in the Tower. The Tower Controller then cleared the pilot for takeoff. The FAA classified the incident as an operational error.
The September accidents, particularly the fatal accidents, show a conglomeration of accident types and indicated probable causes. There were 8 takeoff accidents (3 engine failures, 5 stalls or failure to clear trees and terrain); 9 loss of control and/or maneuvering at low altitude, including spin-ins; a collision of 2 airplanes, and a loss of control of one airplane, during the Reno, Nevada Air Races; one inflight collision with mountains; one flying into a thunderstorm and a crash shedding airplane parts; one formation-demonstration crash; 3 unknowns; one helicopter tail boom and rotor failure inflight; one where the passenger walked into the main rotor; and the accident involving Steve Fossett (never found). There was one GPS approach accident - a second attempt in a 100 ft overcast, with 1/4 mile visibility, and a zero temperature-dewpoint spread, resulting in 3 fatalities.
One fatality, and one serious injury, U.S. Customs accident, practising touch-an-go maneuvers, attempting a full-flap, short field landing, involved dropping the airplane in to the runway (10-12 ft.) and a bounce airborne, then a drift to the right of the runway centerline. The pilot applied power, resulting in a 30 to 40 ft pitchup and stall, further resulting in impact with terrain in a nose-low attitude and following fire. ( A typical example of how not to land an airplane)
One accident indicated an overload of the airplane on takeoff, resulting in 5 fatalities.
In general, we must conclude that the sum total of the accidents reflect carelessness, failure to follow the rules, poor decisions, and poor judgment. These accidents show deviation from safety of flight, and the type of accidents we would like to prevent. Also, unfortuneately, the type of accidents most likely to result in fatalities.
The poor judgment accidents continue for lack of knowledge and training. The poor planning and poor decision accidents we can correct, particularly those accidents involving X-C flight and weather. The carelessness and recklessness - Pilots must follow the rules.
We can attack the safety aspects of flying by separations, such as: 1. Local and X-C flight; 2. Pilot experience - flight hours, certificates, and proficiency issues; 3. Pilot - aircraft type certification; 4. VFR - IFR flying; 5.Rules and Regulations; 6. Aeronautical knowledge.
Supposedly we are doing this now - so what are we doing wrong?
Thanks for listening. R.S.
One incident was a Part 121 Air Carrier DC-9 engine fire warning in flight, and the other was a night VFR incident in which the Tower Controller instructed a Part 135 Lear Jet pilot to taxi into position and hold on R19R at Potomac airport in Washington D.C. Runway 19R was actually closed and the runway lights were off. The runway closure was advertised on ATIS and the closure was placed on the ground radar display in the Tower. The Tower Controller then cleared the pilot for takeoff. The FAA classified the incident as an operational error.
The September accidents, particularly the fatal accidents, show a conglomeration of accident types and indicated probable causes. There were 8 takeoff accidents (3 engine failures, 5 stalls or failure to clear trees and terrain); 9 loss of control and/or maneuvering at low altitude, including spin-ins; a collision of 2 airplanes, and a loss of control of one airplane, during the Reno, Nevada Air Races; one inflight collision with mountains; one flying into a thunderstorm and a crash shedding airplane parts; one formation-demonstration crash; 3 unknowns; one helicopter tail boom and rotor failure inflight; one where the passenger walked into the main rotor; and the accident involving Steve Fossett (never found). There was one GPS approach accident - a second attempt in a 100 ft overcast, with 1/4 mile visibility, and a zero temperature-dewpoint spread, resulting in 3 fatalities.
One fatality, and one serious injury, U.S. Customs accident, practising touch-an-go maneuvers, attempting a full-flap, short field landing, involved dropping the airplane in to the runway (10-12 ft.) and a bounce airborne, then a drift to the right of the runway centerline. The pilot applied power, resulting in a 30 to 40 ft pitchup and stall, further resulting in impact with terrain in a nose-low attitude and following fire. ( A typical example of how not to land an airplane)
One accident indicated an overload of the airplane on takeoff, resulting in 5 fatalities.
In general, we must conclude that the sum total of the accidents reflect carelessness, failure to follow the rules, poor decisions, and poor judgment. These accidents show deviation from safety of flight, and the type of accidents we would like to prevent. Also, unfortuneately, the type of accidents most likely to result in fatalities.
The poor judgment accidents continue for lack of knowledge and training. The poor planning and poor decision accidents we can correct, particularly those accidents involving X-C flight and weather. The carelessness and recklessness - Pilots must follow the rules.
We can attack the safety aspects of flying by separations, such as: 1. Local and X-C flight; 2. Pilot experience - flight hours, certificates, and proficiency issues; 3. Pilot - aircraft type certification; 4. VFR - IFR flying; 5.Rules and Regulations; 6. Aeronautical knowledge.
Supposedly we are doing this now - so what are we doing wrong?
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Friday, October 12, 2007
Bits and Pieces
Hi Readers: The current cost of 100LL aviation fuel is $4.52/gal and Jet A fuel is $4.27/gal.
FAA is now pushing pilots to upgrade their electronics to include ADS-B, Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast for the future. Although the target date for full operation is the year 2020, it will take a while and some dollars.
As if we didn't have enough advertising in our lives, I learned from AVWEB, an aviation information source, that the AD - AIR company in London is selling 5-acre inflatable ads that lay across the landscape to be seen from the air by passengers of Airlines in flight. Atlanta, Denver, and Los Angeles Intl airports are target possibilities. I wish them luck in finding a 5-acre lot near Los Ageles Intl. What will we think of next?
BRS, Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc., manufacturers of whole aircraft parachute systems (such as installed on the Sirius airplane), seatbelts and airbags for automobiles, etc. is now advertising their products for the Cessna 172/182 airplanes, and Experimental and Sports airplanes. Cessna will have the equipment installed in the Skycatcher airplane. The product, a ballistic type charge, has been available for some time, with a deployment speed from 138 mph to over 200 mph, and at an estimated cost from $2,608 to $17,881. This could be a boon for GA safety if all goes well.
GA aircraft accidents show that even high-time Commercial and Air Transport pilots need knowledge and training in selecting and analyzing Weather Services reports in connection with their flight planning. The desired X-C flight level, or changes in flight level, direct flight and alternate routes, below clouds or over-the-top flight, cloud ceilings ahead, hazardous weather en route and at destination, and en route accounts of destination weather are some of the important needs revealed. Avoiding precipitation areas and icing levels are a must in the X-C flight planning. The leading contributing factor in GA accidents is the weather, and takeoff is really only the beginning of the flight plan.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
FAA is now pushing pilots to upgrade their electronics to include ADS-B, Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast for the future. Although the target date for full operation is the year 2020, it will take a while and some dollars.
As if we didn't have enough advertising in our lives, I learned from AVWEB, an aviation information source, that the AD - AIR company in London is selling 5-acre inflatable ads that lay across the landscape to be seen from the air by passengers of Airlines in flight. Atlanta, Denver, and Los Angeles Intl airports are target possibilities. I wish them luck in finding a 5-acre lot near Los Ageles Intl. What will we think of next?
BRS, Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc., manufacturers of whole aircraft parachute systems (such as installed on the Sirius airplane), seatbelts and airbags for automobiles, etc. is now advertising their products for the Cessna 172/182 airplanes, and Experimental and Sports airplanes. Cessna will have the equipment installed in the Skycatcher airplane. The product, a ballistic type charge, has been available for some time, with a deployment speed from 138 mph to over 200 mph, and at an estimated cost from $2,608 to $17,881. This could be a boon for GA safety if all goes well.
GA aircraft accidents show that even high-time Commercial and Air Transport pilots need knowledge and training in selecting and analyzing Weather Services reports in connection with their flight planning. The desired X-C flight level, or changes in flight level, direct flight and alternate routes, below clouds or over-the-top flight, cloud ceilings ahead, hazardous weather en route and at destination, and en route accounts of destination weather are some of the important needs revealed. Avoiding precipitation areas and icing levels are a must in the X-C flight planning. The leading contributing factor in GA accidents is the weather, and takeoff is really only the beginning of the flight plan.
Thanks for listening. R.S.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
