Summary of February 2008 Aircraft Accidents/Incidents Part II

Hi Readers: As you've probably noticed, Part II has been a long time coming. Reason? All through the month of March 2008 NTSB has been revising the February list of accidents as originally reported. We'll have to assume that reports had not been submitted on time because of Winter and severe weather conditions across the Continental U.S. And, of course, we'll have to realize that NTSB has been 'up to its ears' in investigations and reports. Some of the current aviation problems being reported, such as "overflown airplanes ", lack of airplane inspections, the FAA budget situation, and the lack of FAA controller and technical personnel has not helped our total aviation safety either.
To set the record straight, the total February 2008 aircraft accidents are now 88 instead of 53, and 7 incidents instead of 6. There are now 25 fatal accidents instead of 21, and there are 63 nonfatal accidents instead of 34 (quite an increase), and the fatalities increased from 39 to 57. The majority of both fatal and nonfatal accidents were weather-associated and indicated winter weather problems involving airports, takeoff, landing, and inflight operations. In fact, there are indications that pilots are either not being informed or are not considering winter weather conditions concerning runways and taxiways, and takeoff, landing, and inflight operations. Also, since I started my accounting and analysis of aircraft accidents in early 2007, there has been an increase in sport flying, and a striking increase in experimental and amateur-built aircraft flying - unfortunately an increase in accidents and problems of airplane airworthiness and power outages.
Of the 25 fatal accidents (accounting for 57 fatalities) the majority were loss of control, under both VFR and IFR conditions, day and night, on X-C flights of 40 to 1600+ miles (mostly 200-300 miles), and weather associated, about half without a flight plan. Why are pilots so reluctant to file a flight plan? In a hurry, necessity to check the weather, flight too short, I'll climb above it, no reporting? Here lies a basic problem in flight planning. Before I get into the lecture mode, I'll say this. Pilots must start flight planning based on the route of flight and the destination weather (considering an alternate destination), get the best weather briefing possible, file a flight plan, and start checking the weather ahead after climb to cruise. Amen.
There were 53 nonfatal accidents with the usual myriad cause indications - power loss or failure - (followed by loss of control), power or telephone line strikes, landings on snow and ice, bird strikes, severe turbulence, prop strikes on landing, etc.
Of the fatal accidents, of note was a Raytheon C90A (6 fatal) accident on 2-1-08. The aircraft impacted terrain near the Mt. Airy, North Carolina airport following loss of control after a GPS RNAV "missed approach" under IFR conditions. Witnesses reported rain, low cloud ceilings, and fog in the local area. This is an interesting accident in that the details indicate that the insrument-rated commercial pilot did everything "right", up to a point, and then "lost it". It was reported that the pilot had a total of 780 flight hours. It will be interesting to know the pilot's instrument time, time in this airplane, number of instrument approaches made previously, and the GPS instrumentation installed in the airplane. We'll wait until all the facts are in - this loss of control could have been precipitated by a number of factors such as fuel starvation (although there was evidence of fuel), instrument failure, interference in the cockpit, pilot proficiency, et cetera.
Another interesting accident occurred on 2-1-08 involving a Cessna Citation 525 and an inflight loss of control in IFR conditions following takeoff from Augusta, Maine on a X-C flight to Lincoln, Nebraska. The instrument-rated female pilot filed an IFR flight plan for night flight with the FSS and received a standard weather briefing (whatever that was). The pilot and passenger then departed from the snow-covered ramp area and was observed taxiing over ground covered with snow and ice to R/W 35. The weather conditions had turned from light snow to freezing rain. The pilot subsequently, after taxiing across a ditch, taxiied on to R/W 17 (the active R/W) and made takeoff. After takeoff the pilot contacted ATC and reported at 1,000' climbing to
10,000'. One minute later she advised "we've got an attitude indicator failure", subsequently announcing they were not certain which way they were turning. The aircraft impacted terrain 6 miles SSW of Augusta at flight speed. One can only conclude that this flight, under IFR and night conditions must have been compelling. The temperature and dewpoint temperature (not reported) had to be below zero and indicative of serious icing conditions.
There were other fatal accidents, of note for serious errors. For now, let me conclude that pilots must be more weather-conscious in both VFR and IFR flying. Plan for the weather and fly by the weather!
Thanks for listening. R.S.

Radio and Radar Communications

Hi Readers: In flying, our radio and radar communications are all-important - a necessity from the beginning - to get from one point to another - from departure to arrival safely. This includes our use of radar navigation en route - some a convenience, others a necessity.
These radio and radar communications originate from a broad spectrum of frequencies (electromagnetic waves) broadcast and received by Transmitters and Receivers from a Low frequency (100 Khz) through MF, HF, VHF, UHF, SHF, and to EHF (Extremely High Frequency at 100 Ghz). If you've forgotten, Kilo is one thousand, Mega is one million, Gigga is one billion - and, of course, "Hertz" is the ICAO designation for cycles/second. These frequencies in the U.S. are assigned by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) in collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
In the very beginning, whether a local or X-C flight, we must necessarily contact a Ground Control, a Tower, or FSS to get departure instructions, and by regulation we must use the assigned frequencies. Normally, Towers and FSS's are assigned VHF frequencies (118+ Mhz). These frequencies can be found for any airport designated by the FAA. Ground Control frequencies are also in the VHF range, 121.66 to 121.9 Mhz.
En Route, we should expect to communicate with VORs and VORTACs (108-118 Mhz); or use GPS on 1215-1240 Mhz; or ARTC as assigned, perhaps NDB on 190-535 Khz; or LORAN C at 100 Khz; Mode S radar at 1030, 1090 Mhz; TCAS at 9660-1215 Mhz; and ARSR at 1215-1400 Mhz.
On Descent and Approach we'll use ILS Localizer on 108-112 Mhs (VHF) and Glideslope on 328.6 - 335.4 (UHF). And then back to the Tower and Ground Control frequencies. All of these communication frequencies have to be known and used, as needed, by the pilot. The emergency frequency is still 121.5 Mhz.
UNICOM (No Tower or FSS) uses CTAF (Common Traffic Advisory Frequencies) of 122.7-123.0 Mhz. Other communications frequencies designated by the FCC are air-to-air and private airports on 122.750 and 122.850 Mhz; air-to-air GA Helicopter communications on 123.025 Mhz; and Aviation Instruction, Glider, and Hot-Air Balloon operations in the 123.300 Mhz range.
Other Airborne frequency assignmentss are Microwave Landing Systems (MLS) used by DOT, DOD, and NASA are 5000-5150 Mhz, with DME at 960-1215 Mhz; Airborne Weather Navigation Radar at 9300-9500 Mhz; Airborne Radar Altimeter at 4200-4400 Mhz; and Precision Approach Radar (PAR) used by the Military at 9000-9200 Mhz.
Large Ship Radar at 2900-3100 Mhz and above; Amateur Radio (HAM) at 1800 Khz to 250 Ghz, and Space Communications at 2290-2300 Mhz are of interest to many users.
Surface frequencies of interest, also, are AM Radio 535-1700 Khz; FM Radio 88-108 Mhz; Short Wave Radio 5.9-26.1 Mhz; CB Radio 29.96-27.41 Mhz; Television 54-88 Mhz and 174-220 Mhz, depending on the Channel; Cordless Telephones 40 to 50 Mhz; and Cell Phones at 824-849 Mhz.
As the need for air travel and the increase of airplanes in the airspace appear, the lack of available radio frequencies may become a stumbling block in operations as early as 2005. The demand for assigned frequencies is getting beyond the supply. A log-term digital plan seems to be the best option for the future.
Thanks for listening. R.S.

September 2007 Aircraft Accidents/Incidents

Hi Readers: Its time to review the September Accident/Incidents as reported by NTSB. There were 98 accidents and 2 incidents (7 non-U.S. accidents) of which 36 were fatal accidents accounting for 134 fatalities.
One incident was a Part 121 Air Carrier DC-9 engine fire warning in flight, and the other was a night VFR incident in which the Tower Controller instructed a Part 135 Lear Jet pilot to taxi into position and hold on R19R at Potomac airport in Washington D.C. Runway 19R was actually closed and the runway lights were off. The runway closure was advertised on ATIS and the closure was placed on the ground radar display in the Tower. The Tower Controller then cleared the pilot for takeoff. The FAA classified the incident as an operational error.
The September accidents, particularly the fatal accidents, show a conglomeration of accident types and indicated probable causes. There were 8 takeoff accidents (3 engine failures, 5 stalls or failure to clear trees and terrain); 9 loss of control and/or maneuvering at low altitude, including spin-ins; a collision of 2 airplanes, and a loss of control of one airplane, during the Reno, Nevada Air Races; one inflight collision with mountains; one flying into a thunderstorm and a crash shedding airplane parts; one formation-demonstration crash; 3 unknowns; one helicopter tail boom and rotor failure inflight; one where the passenger walked into the main rotor; and the accident involving Steve Fossett (never found). There was one GPS approach accident - a second attempt in a 100 ft overcast, with 1/4 mile visibility, and a zero temperature-dewpoint spread, resulting in 3 fatalities.
One fatality, and one serious injury, U.S. Customs accident, practising touch-an-go maneuvers, attempting a full-flap, short field landing, involved dropping the airplane in to the runway (10-12 ft.) and a bounce airborne, then a drift to the right of the runway centerline. The pilot applied power, resulting in a 30 to 40 ft pitchup and stall, further resulting in impact with terrain in a nose-low attitude and following fire. ( A typical example of how not to land an airplane)
One accident indicated an overload of the airplane on takeoff, resulting in 5 fatalities.
In general, we must conclude that the sum total of the accidents reflect carelessness, failure to follow the rules, poor decisions, and poor judgment. These accidents show deviation from safety of flight, and the type of accidents we would like to prevent. Also, unfortuneately, the type of accidents most likely to result in fatalities.
The poor judgment accidents continue for lack of knowledge and training. The poor planning and poor decision accidents we can correct, particularly those accidents involving X-C flight and weather. The carelessness and recklessness - Pilots must follow the rules.
We can attack the safety aspects of flying by separations, such as: 1. Local and X-C flight; 2. Pilot experience - flight hours, certificates, and proficiency issues; 3. Pilot - aircraft type certification; 4. VFR - IFR flying; 5.Rules and Regulations; 6. Aeronautical knowledge.
Supposedly we are doing this now - so what are we doing wrong?
Thanks for listening. R.S.